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ARTICLES
WILL FDA DATA EXCLUSIVITY MAKE
BIOLOGIC PATENTS PASSÉ?
Vincent J. Roth†
Abstract
Much controversy has ensued over the current twelve-year data
exclusivity period afforded to biosimilars, pursuant to the Biologics
Price Competition and Innovation Act of 2009 (BPCI).
Many commentators speculate whether data exclusivity will
overtake patents as the preferred method of intellectual property
protection for new biologic drugs. A comparison of data exclusivity
with the patent system, however, reveals few similarities and many
differences. Moreover, legislative gaps and absent industry
mechanisms leave a void that is a barrier to entry in the biosimilars
market, referred to here as “regulatory impracticality.”
A survey was conducted with senior management at biopharma
companies regarding data exclusivity as compared to patenting.
Respondents indicated their perceived value in using patents to
attract investment, their views of data exclusivity as effective
protection, their preferred period of data exclusivity, a perception
that patents provide better protection than data exclusivity, and an
intent to continue or increase their level of patent activity.
This article also contains recommendations for statutory
amendments to address regulatory impracticality. It also explains
that, because of the limitations and uncertainties of FDA data
exclusivity and its different yet complimentary characteristics with the
patent system, it is likely data exclusivity will not supplant patents,
but will be one more weapon in the fight for market share.
†
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INTRODUCTION

Bringing new drugs to market entails considerable financial
risk. Because of the significant investment biotechnology research
and development (R&D) requires and the risk of failing to meet
expected returns, the biotechnology industry urged Congress to
provide data exclusivity: a protection for innovators of drug
development data from competitors who desire to reference such
data.2 The result was the current legislative period of 12 years of data
exclusivity for innovators, during which imitators cannot develop
follow-on biologics (FOBs), also called “biosimilars.”3 This twelveyear period is pursuant to the Biologics Price Competition and
Innovation Act of 2009 (BPCI) which provides for accelerated drug
approval of biosimilars through the Food and Drug Administration
(FDA).4
Data exclusivity is a period of time during which the FDA
allows an innovator exclusive use of its own data. This means the
FDA will not allow another drug developer, i.e., an imitator, to rely
on the development data of the originator when submitting data and
results of clinical studies to the FDA for approval of the imitator’s
drug candidate.5 Data exclusivity is automatic upon new drug
approval,6 thereby providing a measure of monopoly for new drug
developers. The patent system, in contrast, requires affirmative efforts
and additional investment from biotech companies. The BPCI was
designed, among other things, to create an abbreviated regulatory
approval pathway for biosimilars, which has generated considerable
1

1. See Average Cost To Develop a New Biotechnology Product Is $1.2 Billion,
According to the Tufts Center for the Study of Drug Development, MARKETWIRE (Nov. 9, 2006,
9:00 AM), http://www.marketwire.com/press-release/average-cost-develop-new-biotechnologyproduct-is-12-billion-according-tufts-center-711827.htm.
2. See Stephen Albainy-Jenei, Senate Committee: 12 Years of Data Exclusivity Is Cool,
DRUG
DISCOVERY
NEWS
(Aug.
2009),
http://www.drugdiscoverynews.com/index.php?newsarticle=3160.
3. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-148,
§ 7002(a)(2)(k)(7)(A), 124 Stat. 119, 807 (2010) [hereinafter PPACA].
4. Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-148,
§§ 7001-7003, 124 Stat. 804 (2010) [hereinafter BPCI] (Title VII, Subtitle A of PPACA).
5. See Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 355(c)(3)(E), (j)(5)(F)
(2011)) [hereinafter FD&C]; see also BPCI § 7002(k)(7)(A)-(B) (under § 7002(k)(7)(A) a
biosimilar may not be approved for 12 years from when the reference product was first licensed,
but under § 7002(k)(7)(B) an application may be submitted after four years after the date the
reference product was first licensed).
6. This applies to new chemical entities (NCEs). See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(F)(ii) (2011).
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attention and debate.7 Legislators expect that biosimilars, like generic
drugs, would get on the market quicker through the abbreviated
process, thus producing cost savings in the development and approval
process. The abbreviated process, however, is too new and not
sufficiently effectuated to determine the actual savings to the
marketplace, threats to the innovator, or benefits to the imitator.
Some commentators suggest that data exclusivity is more
important and effective in protecting intellectual property for drug
developers than the patent regime. Some predict that innovators will
come to rely more on data exclusivity than on patenting to protect
their competitive advantage. However, the abbreviated approval
process for biosimilars is not yet fully defined, thus it is difficult to
predict its impact. More importantly, data exclusivity provides very
different benefits than patent law. One critical characteristic of data
exclusivity that commentators overlook is that until Congress recently
defined data exclusivity period for biosimilars, the biotech industry in
the United States has experienced “continuous data exclusivity,” as
this author calls it, since the inception of the biotech industry in the
early 1980s.8 The passage of the BPCI did not create new data
exclusivity protection; it shortened it to 12 years.
While the patent system is going through its own changes due to
the America Invents Act, data exclusivity is being challenged as well.
The Obama Administration is proposing to reduce the data exclusivity
period from 12 years to 7 years.9 Since there is so much uncertainty
regarding drug approval for biosimilars and data exclusivity is a more
narrow protection than what patents provide, it is likely that patenting
will continue to be an effective and viable weapon in the intellectual
property arsenal.
This article examines the interplay between data exclusivity and
patenting with regard to costs of patent prosecution, R&D and FDA
regulatory approval costs, profits of drug commercialization, actual
7. See Karen Tumulty & Michael Scherer, How Drug-Industry Lobbyists Won on
Health-Care,
TIME
MAGAZINE
(Oct.
22,
2009),
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1931729,00.html; see also FED. TRADE
COMM’N, EMERGING HEALTH CARE ISSUES: FOLLOW-ON BIOLOGIC DRUG COMPETITION 39-46
(2009), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2009/06/P083901biologicsreport.pdf; Kevin E.
Noonan, Data or Market Exclusivity? (Perhaps) Only Congress Knows for Sure, PATENT DOCS
(Jan. 26, 2011), http://www.patentdocs.org/2011/01/data-or-market-exclusivity-perhaps-onlycongress-knows-for-sure.html.
8. See infra Part II.A.
9. Mike Palmedo, Obama’s Deficit Plan Would Reduce Data Exclusivity for Biologics
and Ban Pay-for-Delay Patent Settlements, INFOJUSTICE.ORG (Sept. 20, 2011),
http://infojustice.org/archives/5585.
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protections experienced, and other benefits—whether real or
perceived—that data exclusivity and patenting provide. Part II
examines the background of drug development with some legislative
history, points out the difference between generic drugs and biologics,
distinguishes data exclusivity from market exclusivity, and explains
the current regulatory terrain. Part III reviews protections the patent
system provides the pharmaceutical and biotechnology industries as
well as some of the drawbacks of the U.S. patent system. Part IV
considers the incentives available through the drug approval process
as compared to patent law. A comparison of data exclusivity with the
patent system will reveal a few similarities and many differences.
Part V reveals legislative gaps and absent industry mechanisms,
referred to in this article as “regulatory impracticality,” which acts as
another barrier to entry in the biosimilars market. Part VI contains a
survey conducted for this article to elicit opinions of senior
management in biotech companies regarding their opinions and
expectations about data exclusivity as compared to patenting. As of
August 6, 2012, 73 respondents provided their opinions regarding
FDA data exclusivity and the U.S. patent system. Respondents
indicated patents are still quite valuable in attracting investment.
While few companies in this population are developing biosimilars,
the majority perceives data exclusivity as a valuable and effective
protection from competition and favors a period of 9-12 years of data
exclusivity. This article’s survey also reveals a perception that patents
provide better protection than data exclusivity and that even with the
availability of data exclusivity as an extra protection, most
respondents intend to continue or increase their level of patent
activity.
Part VII provides recommendations for statutory amendments to
address regulatory impracticality. This article concludes with an
explanation that, because of the limitations and uncertainties of FDA
data exclusivity and its different yet complimentary characteristics
with the patent system, it is likely data exclusivity will not supplant
patenting, but will be one more weapon in the fight for market share.
II. THE REGULATORY FRAMEWORK FOR BIOLOGICS
In addition to the traditional intellectual property regimes of
patent law, trademark law, copyright law, and trade secret law, life
science companies10 can also protect their intellectual property
10. Broadly defined, life science companies may encompass a variety of companies. For
purposes of this article, pharmaceutical companies, or “pharma,” are companies that produce

ROTH

254

2/28/2013 10:29 AM

SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J.

[Vol. 29

through data exclusivity, the regulatory framework of the FDA. The
following section provides some background on the biotechnology
industry.
A. Generics versus Biologics
The biotechnology industry was created after Stanley Cohen and
Herbert Boyer made their initial discoveries of recombinant DNA
technology in 1973.11 Early methods in biotechnology lead to the first
biologic product, recombinant human insulin, approved by the FDA
in 1982.12 The biotechnology industry has been flourishing ever since
with over 400 biologic drugs marketed to treat over 200 conditions.13
The drug development pipeline in 2011 in the United States contained
approximately 900 biologics.14
Faced with the goal of creating an incentive structure in the
pharmaceutical industry to increase competition and reduce the cost
to the marketplace for drugs, Congress enacted the Hatch-Waxman
Act in 1984 (Hatch-Wax).15 The act implemented an accelerated FDA
approval process for generic drugs,16 which successfully introduced
generic, small-molecule drugs to the market by allowing for
substantial costs savings in drug development.17 The advent of the
generic drug market drove down costs of small-molecule drugs by an
average of almost 75%.18 While Hatch-Wax was successful in
traditional small molecule drugs through chemical processes, called “chemical drugs.”
Biotechnology companies, or “biotech,” are companies that produce large protein molecules
using living organisms, called “biologics.”
11. See Biotechnology at 25: The Founders, U.C. BERKELEY LIBRARY (May 23, 2000),
http://bancroft.berkeley.edu/Exhibits/Biotech/25.html.
12. JUDITH A. JOHNSON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 34045, FDA REGULATION OF
FOLLOW-ON BIOLOGICS 1 (2010).
13. Zach Patton, Complex Rx: Biologic Meds Are The Wonder Drugs of Our Time. Can
(Oct.
2007),
We
Afford
Them?,
GOVERNING
http://www.governing.com/topics/politics/Complex-Rx.html.
14. Grady Forrer, 900 New Medicines in Development Show the Biotechnology Medical
Revolution
Is
Going
Strong,
PHRMA
(Sept.
14,
2011,
11:18
AM),
http://www.phrma.org/catalyst/900-new-medicines-development-show-biotechnology-medicalrevolution-going-strong.
15. Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98417, 98 Stat. 1585 (1984) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15, 21, 35 U.S.C.).
16. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j) (2011).
17. LAURENCE J. KOTLIKOFF, STIMULATING INNOVATION IN THE BIOLOGICS INDUSTRY:
A BALANCED APPROACH TO MARKETING EXCLUSIVITY 10 (Sept. 2008), available at
http://people.bu.edu/kotlikof/New%20Kotlikoff%20Web%20Page/Kotlikoff_Innovation_in_Bio
logics21.pdf.
18. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, HOW INCREASED COMPETITION FROM GENERIC DRUGS HAS
AFFECTED PRICES AND RETURNS IN THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY 32-33 (1998) (showing
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creating a generics market for chemical drugs, it failed to create a
generics market for biologics.
Chemical drugs are based on small molecules that typically
contain dozens of atoms, while biologics are based on large molecules
that may consist of millions of atoms.19 The figures below show an
example of the difference in the scale of a molecule of caffeine, which
is a small and fairly simple molecule, and a molecule of human
growth hormone, which is a large and very complex protein molecule.

Figure 1. Caffeine (generic)

Figure 2. Human Growth
Hormone (biologic)

The scale of size is not the only dramatic difference. Small
molecule drugs are made using commonly known chemical
processes.20 Biologics, however, often being protein-based drugs,21
are made using biological processes inside living organisms.22 The
process for manufacturing a biologic is much more complex and
much more expensive than the chemical methods for making smallmolecule drugs,23 resulting in a higher cost product.
the average generic price was 22.40% of the innovator in 1994).
19. WENDY H. SCHACHT & JOHN R. THOMAS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 33901,
FOLLOW-ON BIOLOGICS: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND INNOVATION ISSUES 2-3 (2009).
20. Id.
21. Biologics include a “wide range of products such as vaccines, blood and blood
components, allergenics, somatic cells, gene therapy, tissues, and recombinant therapeutic
proteins.” What Is a Biologic?, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. (June 2, 2009),
http://answers.hhs.gov/questions/3262.
22. SCHACHT & THOMAS, supra note 19, at 3.
23. Michał Nowicki, Basic Facts about Biosimilars, 30 KIDNEY & BLOOD PRESSURE
RES. 267, 268 (2007).
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Biologics on average cost 20 times that of the average chemical
drug.24 Yet even with such high price tags, the market share for
biologics is expected to grow. In 2000, biologics sales accounted for
11% of all U.S. drug sales.25 In 2012, biologics represented 20% of
the drugs on the market with projections that by 2014 approximately
50% of the drugs on the market will be biologics.26 Also in 2000,
there was only one biologic in the top ten drugs on the market, but by
2008, half of the top ten drugs were biologics.27 In 2007, sales of
biologics were $75 billion worldwide.28 Although actual numbers are
not available at this time to confirm 2012 predictions, by the end of
2012, sales of biologics were expected to exceed $175 billion
worldwide.29 In 2011, over 2,900 drugs were in development in the
United States30 with 900 being biologics.31 Experts predicted half the
drugs approved by the FDA in 2012 would be biologics.32
Drug developers use biologics to treat ailments in a number of
ways.33 Over time, biologics have expanded and diversified
24. Tumulty & Scherer, supra note 7. For example, the treatment of arthritis with one of
the most expensive small-molecule drugs costs about $300 each year, whereas treatment for
arthritis with Enbrel, a brand name biologic, costs about $20,000 per year. Patton, supra note 13.
The breast cancer drug Herceptin can cost up to $48,000 for a year of treatment. Tumulty &
Scherer, supra note 7. The colon cancer drug Avastin costs about $100,000 per year and
Cerezyme, a brand name biologic that treats Gaucher disease, a life-threatening enzyme
deficiency, costs between $200,000 and $500,000 per year. Kathleen Jaeger, Editorial, Creating
a Workable Biogenerics Pathway for Patients, 5 J. OF GENERIC MEDS. 1, 1 (2007).
25. Patton, supra note 13.
26. WENDY H. SCHACHT & JOHN R. THOMAS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 41483,
FOLLOW-ON BIOLOGICS: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND INNOVATION ISSUES 1 (2012).
27. Erwin A. Blackstone & Joseph P. Fuhr, Jr., Innovation and Competition: Will
Biosimilars Succeed?, 9 BIOTECH. HEALTHCARE, no. 1, 2012, at 24.
28. LEIGH PURVIS, AARP PUB. POLICY INST., BIOLOGICS IN PERSPECTIVE: THE CASE FOR
GENERIC BIOLOGIC DRUGS 1 (2009).
29. Sheela AK, Biologics Market—G7 Industry Size, Market Share, Trends, Analysis, and
Forecasts 2012-2018, SBWIRE (Oct. 11, 2012), http://www.sbwire.com/pressreleases/biologics-market-g7-industry-size-market-share-trends-analysis-and-forecasts-20122018-170890.htm.
30. Medicines in Development, PHRMA, http://www.phrma.org/research/new-medicines
(last visited Jan. 18, 2013).
31. Forrer, supra note 14.
32. Val Brickates Kennedy, Generic Versions of Biologic Medications Are Coming,
MARKETWATCH (Sept. 3, 2009, 12:22 PM), http://www.marketwatch.com/story/genericversions-of-biologic-medications-coming-2009-08-28.
33. See, e.g., Billy Tauzin, Biotechnology Research Continues to Bolster Arsenal Against
Disease with 633 Medicines in Development, in PHARM. RESEARCH & MFRS. OF AM.,
MEDICINES IN DEVELOPMENT: BIOTECHNOLOGY 1 (2008) (explaining that early biotechnology
medicines targeted fairly simple protein deficiencies and were produced by splicing genes into
bacteria to produce proteins such as insulin for diabetes, blood clotting factors for hemophilia,
and human erythropoietin for treating anemia).
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considerably.34
Although Hatch-Wax encouraged the introduction of generic
small-molecule drugs, it failed for biologics because the
manufacturing processes for producing biologics are far more
complex than the chemical processes of small-molecule drugs. The
sensitivity of biological production to manufacturing conditions is far
greater than that of chemical production. Variations in manufacturing
conditions result in variation of the biologic structure. Thus, the
production process cannot guarantee certainty in the structure of a
protein drug.35 Differences in starting materials or manufacturing
conditions may result in structural variations between biologics
intended to be identical.36 For these reasons, a biologic is unlikely to
be an exact replica of an originator’s product.37 Furthermore, a change
in structure may result in different characteristics or performance,
such as efficacy, biological activity, and mechanism of action.38
Small-molecule generics, in contrast, typically achieve structural
identity to the brand name chemical drug.
Because biologics are highly complex molecules, manufactured
in living organisms with a high sensitivity to changes in
manufacturing process, exact replication is nearly impossible.39 The
best that current scientific techniques can offer is to determine
whether a biosimilar is similar to an innovator.40 Biosimilars cannot
truly be “generic” biologics because biosimilars can only achieve
similarity, not identity.41 Thus, the FDA does not consider pioneering
biologics capable of having “generics” and instead the FDA uses the
term “biosimilar” or “follow-on biologics” to refer to imitator

34. Id. Monoclonal antibodies, for example, are laboratory-made versions of the
antibodies that comprise the body’s natural defense against invaders. Interferons affect a cell’s
ability to reproduce, and can treat many diseases such as osteoporosis, chronic granulomatous
disease, genital warts, multiple sclerosis, hairy cell leukemia. Antisense technology creates a
mirror image of a defective gene that binds to it to prevent the body from producing a harmful
protein. Therapeutic vaccines spur the body’s immune system to fight disease and gene therapy
can treat disease by augmenting, replacing, or inactivating existing genes. Id.
35. Linfong Tzeng, Note, Follow-On Biologics, Data Exclusivity, and the FDA, 25
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 135, 138 (2010).
36. Id.
37. Aparna Yerramilli, Biologics and Biosimilars: Are They?, CARDIOLOGY TODAY
(Apr. 2011), http://www.healio.com/Cardiology/news/print/cardiology-today/%7BC6296C4CACB6-4EC3-868D-C39592E2D35D%7D/Biologics-and-biosimilars-Are-they.
38. Id.
39. Nowicki, supra note 23, at 268.
40. Tzeng, supra note 35, at 139.
41. Id.
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biologic drugs.42
Structural similarity does not translate into matching therapeutic
properties either, because small differences in structure affect the
biologic function of the biosimilar.43 A biosimilar may have structural
similarity to a brand name drug, it may treat the same medical
indication, and it may utilize the same mechanism of action, but
subtle differences in structure may translate into variations in safety
or efficacy of the biosimilar as compared to the innovator drug.44
Because current scientific analysis cannot account for or anticipate
differences in safety or efficacy, biologics present the FDA with
regulatory concerns over immunogenicity and interchangeability not
encountered with generics.
“Immunogenicity” refers to the immune response the human
body has to the biosimilar.45 An originator’s product may experience
a particular immune response in the body, but the slight variation in
the biosimilar’s structure might trigger a much greater, or lesser,
immunogenic response. Similarly, a brand name product will have a
certain effect in the body, but, again, a biosimilar with even a slight
difference in structure may have a dramatically greater or lesser
effect. It is this unknown difference in efficacy that is the concern
behind interchangeability. This is generally not a concern with
generics because their structure is identical to the brand name drug.46
“Interchangeability” refers to whether a biosimilar may be safely
substituted for the innovator drug during the course of treatment.47 If
a biosimilar causes a wildly different reaction, it may not be
interchanged with the originator’s drug.
Interchangeability is achieved with the reference biologic if the
“risk in terms of safety or diminished efficacy of alternating or
switching between use of the biological product and the reference
product is not greater than the risk of using the reference product
without such alternation or switch.”48 If a biosimilar is
interchangeable with the reference product, the biosimilar “may be
substituted for the reference product without the intervention of the
42.
43.

JOHNSON, supra note 12, at 1.
See Simon D. Roger, Biosimilars: How Similar or Dissimilar Are They?, 11
NEPHROLOGY 341, 342 (2006).
44. Id. at 342-43.
45. Id. at 343.
46. Tzeng, supra note 35, at 139.
47. Id. at 150.
48. Affordable Health Care for America Act, H.R. 3962, 111th Cong. § 2575(a)(2)
(2009).
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health care provider who prescribed the reference product.”49
Many people experience interchangeability with generics in their
daily lives—after a visit to one’s physician for seasonal allergies one
might go to the pharmacy with a prescription for Flonaze, a brand
name nasal allergy medication, and instead simply request the generic
version, Fluticasone. Neither the pharmacist nor the patient needs to
confer with the prescribing physician and thus Fluticasone is
interchangeable with Flonaze. This is not the case with biosimilars.
Scientists in the United States have yet to find biologics that are
interchangeable. The FDA purportedly determines interchangeability,
like biosimilarity and immunogenicity, on a case-by-case basis.
Unfortunately, at today’s state of scientific development, only clinical
trials can inform whether structural variations in biologics translate
into changes in safety or efficacy.50 Therefore, expensive and timeconsuming clinical trials must be used to determine immunogenicity
and interchangeability of biosimilars.51 The FDA, however, has
indicated that it does not believe current technology is evolved
enough to truly establish interchangeability.52
Since there is so much uncertainty regarding drug approval for
biosimilars and data exclusivity is a more narrow protection than what
patents provide, it is likely that patenting will continue to be an
effective and worthwhile method of protecting intellectual property
for drug developers. The next section explores data exclusivity.
B. Incentives for Innovators and Imitators
There are many reasons to develop and market a new drug
product, such as commercial interests in generating sales, revenues,
and profits, as well as humanitarian interests in improving health and
lifestyles. Pharmaceutical companies expend tremendous amounts of
money developing new drugs. The average cost of developing a new
chemical drug is $802 million,53 whereas the average cost of
49. Id. § 2575(b)(3).
50. Tzeng, supra note 35, at 140.
51. Id.
52. Kevin E. Noonan & James V. DeGuilio, The Biosimilar Drug Approval Pathway:
Draft FDA Guidance and Beyond, MCDONNELL BOEHNEN HULBERT & BERGHOFF, LLP (Mar.
27, 2012) (remarks of James V. DeGuilio, Associate Attorney, McDonnell Boehnen Hulbert &
Berghoff,
LLP,
during
webinar
presentation),
available
at
http://www.mbhb.com/events/xpqEventDetail.aspx?xpST=EventDetail&event=44.
53. Innovative R&D Strategies Remain Key to Developing New Medicines, According to
the Tufts Center for the Study of Drug Development, BUSINESSWIRE (Jan. 5, 2005),
http://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20050105005039/en/Innovative-Strategies-RemainKey-Developing-Medicines-Tufts.
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developing a new biologic is $1.2 billion.54 In passing Hatch-Wax,
Congress wanted to balance the public’s interest in having cheaper,
generic drugs on the market without discouraging the investment in
innovation necessary to create new treatments.55 Various incentives in
the drug approval process encourage inventors to expend the
significant resources required to bring a drug to market. Congress
built three different mechanisms into the drug approval scheme to
help protect the investment of developers, providing developers with
the hope that they will recoup their costs and make a profit, which, in
turn, benefits society by providing new and improved treatments.
These mechanisms are: patent term extensions, data exclusivity, and
market exclusivity.
1. Patent Term Extension
Hatch-Wax offers innovators the possibility of patent
extension.56 A patent provides the patent owner the right to exclude
others from making, using, or selling the patented invention.57 In the
drug industry a patent may cover a drug’s composition, its
manufacturing process, the method of use or a combination of these.
A patent application is usually filed early in the drug development
stage because an application typically must be filed within one year of
the discovery or invention58 and, if issued, the patent will have a term
of 20 years from the date of filing.59 Clinical trials, however, may take
over six years to complete and FDA approval may take another year

54. Average Cost to Develop a New Biotechnology Product Is $1.2 Billion, supra note 1.
55. See Arie M. Michelsohn, “Follow-On” Biologics: What Will It Take?, SCITECH
LAW., Fall 2008, at 4, 6.
56. The Hatch-Waxman Act allows patent term extension for small-molecule drugs under
the Federal Food Drug and Cosmetic Act of 1938, as amended, and for biologics under the
Public Health Service Act of 1944, ch. 373, 58 Stat. 682 (1944) (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. §§ 201-300bbb (2011)), to allow for the time required to obtain FDA approval. See Drug
Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585
(1984) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15, 21, 35 U.S.C.).
57.
35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2011) (“Except as otherwise provided in this title, whoever
without authority makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells any patented invention, within the United
States or imports into the United States any patented invention during the term of the patent
therefor, infringes the patent.”).
58. Id. § 102(b) (“A person shall be entitled to a patent unless . . . the invention was
patented or described in a printed publication in this or a foreign country or in public use or on
sale in this country, more than one year prior to the date of the application for patent in the
United States . . . .”). There are some exceptions to the one year filing period.
59. Id. § 154(a)(2) (“Subject to the payment of fees under this title, such grant shall be for
a term beginning on the date on which the patent issues and ending 20 years from the date on
which the application for the patent was filed . . . .”).
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or two.60 The average total time in drug development, from preclinical
testing to FDA approval, is 8.5 years, with a possible maximum of 20
years.61
Assuming a patent is issued, a substantial portion of patent life
may lapse before the drug reaches the market. To accommodate this
regulatory “delay,” Hatch-Wax provides an opportunity to add up to
five years of patent term to account for the time pursuing FDA
approval.62 Such an applicant may only have one patent extended per
product even if the product undergoing FDA approval is covered by
multiple patents.63 Another limitation on the patent term extension is
that the rights that are extended are limited to the uses for which the
drug was subject to FDA regulatory approval delays, and thus the
extension does not restore the full scope of traditional patent rights.64
Nonetheless, after extension, the average innovator of a chemical
drug retains about 11-13 years of patent protection upon FDA
approval.65
2. Data Exclusivity
In addition to patent extension, Hatch-Wax provides a five year
period of data exclusivity for new drugs.66 For generics providers,
Hatch-Wax established a pathway to obtain abbreviated approval.67
Specifically, section 505(j) of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic
Act (FD&C Act) allows generic drug companies to rely on an
innovator’s FDA filings to demonstrate safety and effectiveness,
provided that the generic drug is “bioequivalent” to the originator’s

60. Joseph A. DiMasi & Henry G. Grabowski, The Cost of Biopharmaceutical R&D: Is
Biotech Different?, 28 MANAGERIAL & DECISION ECONS. 469, 475 (2007).
61. Michael Dickson & Jean Paul Gagnon, Key Factors in the Rising Cost of New Drug
Discovery and Development, 3 NATURE REVS.: DRUG DISCOVERY 417, 418 fig.1 (2004).
62. 35 U.S.C. § 156. The Hatch-Waxman Act allows for restoration of half the time spent
in clinical trials and the full time spent by the FDA during final approval, up to five years, but
caps the maximum patent life after restoration at 14 years, so the full five year restoration is not
available if the drug developer retains a patent term of greater than nine years prior to patent
term extension under the Hatch-Waxman Act.
63. JOHN R. THOMAS, PHARMACEUTICAL PATENT LAW 284-85 (2005).
64. Id. at 300.
65. Henry G. Grabowski & Margaret Kyle, Generic Competition and Market Exclusivity
Periods in Pharmaceuticals, 28 MANAGERIAL & DECISION ECONS. 491, 495-96 (2007).
66. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(F)(ii) (2011). After a drug containing a new chemical entity is
approved, no one else may submit an application “for a drug product that contains the same
active moiety as in the new chemical entity for a period of 5 years from the date of approval of
the first approved new drug application.” 21 C.F.R. § 314.108 (2012).
67. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j).
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drug.68 A generic drug is considered bioequivalent if the subsequent
applicant shows identical chemical structure for the active ingredient
in the drug and other similar characteristics, such as route of
administration, dosage, strength, and therapeutic formulation.69 If
these are demonstrated, the generic provider may then rely on the
originator’s clinical trial data in the generic filer’s drug application
process.70 Demonstrating bioequivalence is far less expensive in drug
development because Hatch-Wax excuses the generic applicant from
conducting full clinical trials.
Clinical trials typically require three phases of testing on
humans: a Phase 1 trial of a small population to test safety and
toxicity, a Phase 2 trial in a moderate population to test the optimum
dosage level of the new drug, and a Phase 3 trial in a large population
to test the efficacy of the drug.71 The FDA establishes for the
applicant a recommended size for each population.72
By way of example, a Phase 1 clinical trial for a particular drug
might require testing on 30 patients, with a Phase 2 trial on 100
patients and a Phase 3 trial on perhaps 500 or more patients.73 Thus an
innovator, in this example, must test the drug on over 630 patients. A
generic applicant able to show bioequivalence will still have to
conduct a Phase 1 trial, say on 30 patients, to demonstrate safety, but
then would conduct what is called a “pivotal trial,” which has
combined elements of the typical Phase 2 and Phase 3 trials for
showing optimum dosage and efficacy.74 This is required on a modest
patient population similar to the size of a Phase 2 trial.75 Thus the
generic applicant may only have to test on 130 patients in order to get
its drug approved if it can show bioequivalence and rely on the
innovator’s data.76

68. Id. § 355(j)(2).
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Interview with Judi Appleman, Director of Regulatory Affairs, Phage
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., in San Diego, Cal. (Feb. 13, 2012).
72. Id.
73. This example is a very small patient population; the FDA may require thousands of
subjects to be tested in clinical trials for a new chemical entity or new indication submitted
under 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(2). See PETER E. CARLSON, NAT’L CTR. ON EDUC. & ECON.,
CLINICAL
RESEARCH
INDUSTRY
TRENDS
5
(2007),
available
at
http://www.workforcesolutionsalamo.org/pdf/NCEE%20Clinical%20Research%20Industry%20
Report.pdf.
74. Interview with Judi Appleman, supra note 71.
75. Id.
76. Id.
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The cost per patient varies widely by drug depending on the
therapeutic indication and may vary from phase to phase in the
clinical trials. Assume, however, for this example that it costs a drug
developer $20,000 to treat each test subject. The innovator would
spend over $12.6 million testing its 630 patients, while the generic
provider demonstrating bioequivalence would spend only $2.6 million
testing 130 patients. This hypothetical, representing a very small
example, holds a $10 million savings. The cost benefit of using the
abbreviated drug approval process is quite dramatic.
Although Hatch-Wax grants a generic applicant the ability to
reference the originator’s clinical trial data, the data exclusivity period
granted to the innovator requires the generic applicant to wait five
years after the approval of the new innovator drug before the generic
developer may file an application that relies on the originator’s
clinical data.77 During the data exclusivity period, the innovator
enjoys a measure of market protection because generic products are
delayed from entering the market, which in turn limits competition.78
The average remaining patent life on newly approved drugs that
have patent protection is approximately 12 years.79 In these situations
data exclusivity persists for a relatively short time and thus patent
protection is the primary means by which chemical drug innovators
prohibit entry of generic competition into the marketplace.80 Only
when there is less than five years of patent term remaining after FDA
approval does the importance of data exclusivity become more
prominent.81
With such dramatic costs savings in drug development available,
as demonstrated with the above example, Hatch-Wax unquestionably
stimulated the generics market.82 When Hatch-Wax was enacted in
77. The waiting period is typically five years, but four years under certain circumstances.
See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(F)(ii) (explaining that “no application may be submitted . . . before the
expiration of five years from the date of the approval of the application under subsection (b) of
this section, except that such an application may be submitted under this subsection after the
expiration of four years from the date of the approval of the subsection (b) application if it
contains a certification of patent invalidity or noninfringement described in subclause (IV) of
paragraph (2)(A)(vii)”).
78. A competitor can still enter the market by conducting its own full clinical trials,
which may take more time than the abbreviated process, but without the ability to rely on the
innovator’s data, the high cost of full clinical trials may deter market entry. See Gerald J.
Mossinghoff, Overview of the Hatch-Waxman Act and Its Impact on the Drug Development
Process, 54 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 187, 189 (1999).
79. Tzeng, supra note 35, at 143.
80. Id.
81. See id.
82. Id. at 144.
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1984, generic drugs comprised only 19% of prescriptions.83 In 2009,
generics represented 75% of prescriptions in the United States.84
Estimates indicate consumers save $8 to $10 billion dollars through
the use of generics.85 Projections for generic dispensing in 2013 are
80% to 90%.86
3. Market Exclusivity
Some commentators confuse market exclusivity and data
exclusivity, referring to them as one and the same thing.87 They are
not. Data exclusivity is a limitation on a competitor’s ability to rely
on the data of the innovator. A competitor may still enter the market
by developing its own data through its own clinical trial activity.
Market exclusivity, however, is a complete bar to competitors for
drug approval. “Market exclusivity” is a term that refers to the FDA’s
refusal to approve another application for a particular drug for
commercialization during a period of time after the innovator drug is
approved to treat a particular indication.88
There are very limited circumstances under which an applicant
may procure market exclusivity. Hatch-Wax provides for market
exclusivity for orphan drugs and generics seeking accelerated
approval if the drug is accompanied by a Paragraph IV certification
and the applicant is successful in challenging an innovator’s patent in
court. The latter is granted market exclusivity for only 180 days. Of
more significance and prominence is “orphan drug” status, which
provides market exclusivity for seven years.89 Market exclusivity is
83. FED. TRADE COMM’N, GENERIC DRUG ENTRY PRIOR TO PATENT EXPIRATION: AN
FTC STUDY 7 (2002).
84. IMS Health Reports U.S. Prescription Sales Grew 5.1 Percent in 2009, to $300.3
(Apr.
1,
2010),
Billion,
BLOOMBERG
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=au5OPQhtu2bI.
85. The US Generic Drugs Industry Overview, THEMEDICA (Apr. 6, 2009. 10:50 AM),
http://www.themedica.com/articles/2009/04/the-us-generic-drugs-industry.html.
86. See MEDCO, 2011 DRUG TREND REPORT: HEALTHCARE 2020, at 35 (2012).
87. See, e.g., Joyce Wing Yan Tam, Note, Biologics Revolution: The Intersection of
Biotechnology, Patent Law, and Pharmaceutical Regulation, 98 GEO. L.J. 535, 535-37 (2010).
88. See Orphan Drug Act, 21 U.S.C. § 360cc(a)(2) (2011) (“[F]or a drug designated . . .
for a rare disease or condition, the Secretary may not approve another application ... for such
drug for such disease or condition . . . until the expiration of seven years . . . .”). There is also a
marketing exclusivity for a six-month period for pediatric treatments under section 505A of the
FD&C Act (called the “pediatric exclusivity”). See FD&C Act, 21 U.S.C. § 355a (2011).
89. The Orphan Drug Act (ODA) was passed in the United States in January of 1983 as a
means to encourage pharmaceutical companies to develop drugs for diseases that have a small
market, which are defined as disorders affecting fewer than 200,000. John Henkel, Orphan Drug
Law Matures into Medical Mainstay, FDA CONSUMER, May-June 1999, at 29, 30. Companies
that develop an orphan drug not only may sell it without competition for seven years, but may
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broader than data exclusivity because market exclusivity prevents all
competitors from entering the market even if a competitor conducts
its own full-scale clinical trials.90 The FDA will not approve a generic
or biosimilar version of the drug for treatment of the same disease or
condition during the market exclusivity period.
4. Patent Challenges under the Hatch-Waxman Act
In addition to providing limited patent term extensions, market
exclusivity and data exclusivity, Hatch-Wax contains another direct
impact on the patent system. When an innovator applies for drug
approval with the FDA it must identify each patent it holds that is
applicable to the drug. Under Hatch-Wax, subsequent applicants that
are seeking the benefit of the abbreviated approval process must file
one of four different certifications, known as Paragraph I through
Paragraph IV certifications.91
Each certification addresses a different situation for the
subsequent applicant. A Paragraph I certification is filed if the
originator failed to file its patent information with the FDA.92 A
Paragraph II certification is filed if the innovator’s patent has
expired.93 A Paragraph III certification is filed if the innovator has a
valid patent that will expire and the subsequent applicant is requesting
approval on the date after that patent expires.94 A Paragraph IV
certification is filed if the subsequent applicant believes the
originator’s patent is either invalid or not infringed by the subsequent
applicant by the manufacture, use, or sale of the new drug for which

also receive clinical trial tax incentives. Andrew Pollack, Orphan Drug Law Spurs Debate, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 30, 1990, at D1. The ODA was implemented to encourage R&D investment in
diseases with small patient populations, which might otherwise not be appealing for companies
to target. During the period from the inception of the ODA in 1983 to May 2010, the FDA
approved 353 orphan drugs and granted orphan designations to 2,116 compounds. Walter
Armstrong, Pharma’s Orphans, PHARMACEUTICAL EXECUTIVE, May 2010, at 83, 84. The ODA
is widely acknowledged to be a success. Id. at 86. Moreover, many other countries––particularly
the European Union—have orphan drug laws comparable to the U.S. laws. See, e.g., Carolyne
Hathaway, John Manthei & Cassie Scherer, Exclusivity Strategies in the United States and
European
Union,
FDLI UPDATE,
May-June
2009,
at
34,
available
at
http://www.lw.com/upload/pubcontent/_pdf/pub2655_1.pdf.
90. Maxwell R. Morgan, Regulation of Innovation Under Follow-On Biologics
Legislation: FDA Exclusivity as an Efficient Incentive Mechanism, 11 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L.
REV. 93, 98 (2010).
91. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(I)-(IV) (2011) (containing each of the four certifications
as subparagraphs (I) through (IV), respectively).
92. Id. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(I).
93. Id. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(II).
94. Id. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(III).
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the application is submitted.95
Under a Paragraph IV certification the first applicant to
successfully challenge the innovator’s patent in court also receives the
added benefit of a 180-day market exclusivity period.96 This limited
market exclusivity period is designed to encourage generic developers
to file and challenge first. Some commentators believe this added
benefit encourages drug developers to both design around others’
patents as well as challenge invalid patents.97
C. The Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act of 2009
(BPCI)
The biotech industry has a burgeoning abbreviated regulatory
approval pathway for biosimilars, which has generated considerable
attention. Regulatory approval for biologics was initiated under the
Public Health Service Act of 1944 (PHS Act) pursuant to which the
FDA currently approves “biological products.”98 This approval
process for biologics resembles the pathway for chemical drugs under
the FD&C Act.99
An innovator faces similar requirements whether it seeks
approval of a biologic under the PHS Act or a chemical drug under
the FD&C Act. However, a subsequent applicant seeking to reference
the innovator’s clinical trial data faces significantly different
requirements under these two regimes. Approval of a new drug,
biologic or chemical, begins with an application to the FDA, and
upon allowance by the FDA the drug then undergoes clinical trials to
determine its safety and efficacy.100 As noted above, clinical trials
progress from small-scale human testing in Phase 1 to large-scale
human testing in Phase 3, with costs increasing at each phase.101
While Hatch-Wax created an abbreviated approval process
allowing generics to rely on an originator’s clinical trial data,102 no
such provision existed for biologics under the PHS Act. Thus, since
the advent of biotechnology techniques in 1982, biotech companies
have enjoyed what will be called here “continuous data exclusivity.”

95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.

Id. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(IV).
Id. § 355(j)(5)(B).
FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 83, at 7.
Public Health and Welfare Act, 42 U.S.C. § 262 (2011).
See JOHNSON, supra note 12, at 6.
42 U.S.C. § 262(a)(2)(C).
DiMasi & Grabowski, supra note 60, at 472.
See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j) (2011).
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Except for one limited case, which will be discussed in a moment,
imitators have not been able to rely on an innovator’s data for the last
30 years—amounting to continuous data exclusivity. Thus new
market entrants must bear full costly and time-consuming clinical
trials in order to attain approval for a biosimilar.103 While the
European Union and Canada have more developed regulatory
pathways for biosimilars and a number of biosimilars approved and
on their markets, the United States currently has only one biosimilar
approved, Omnitrope, a human growth hormone (HGH) product by
Sandoz.
Sandoz is the generic drug unit of the Swiss pharmaceutical
group Novartis. Sandoz filed its new drug application (NDA) for
Omnitrope in 2003. In order to get its product approved, Sandoz sued
the FDA in 2005 complaining that the FDA was “dragging its feet.”104
This was years before the BPCI, and thus Sandoz sought accelerated
approval under the FD&C Act pursuant to Hatch-Wax, again marking
the failure of Hatch-Wax with regard to biologics. Later that year, the
FDA informed Sandoz it was unable to decide whether to approve
Omnitrope, citing various scientific and legal issues.105 This is not
surprising, as an accelerated approval process for biosimilars was not
yet established because of the immunogenicity and interchangeability
issues described above in Part II.A.
Nevertheless, the FDA staff later apparently informed Sandoz
that Omnitrope was safe and effective for its intended use but that it
was indistinguishable from Pfizer’s innovator product, Genotropin.106
Sandoz filed suit complaining that the FDA had failed to act on the
NDA for Omnitrope within the statutory time frame, also alleging that
the FDA had no basis in fact or law to deny its approval.107 While the
Sandoz story is an aberration, it punctuates the quandary in the United
States—legislation that provides for a biosimilar market but no
concrete means to implement it.
Establishing a biosimilars market involves considerations not
encountered in the generic pharmaceutical marketplace. Neither
Hatch-Wax nor the PHS Act addressed these concerns (e.g.,
immunogenicity and interchangeability), nor could they. The next
103.
104.

See JOHNSON, supra note 12, at 6.
Phil Taylor, Sandoz Takes Issue with FDA over Biogenerics, IN-PHARMA
TECHNOLOGIST.COM (Sept. 15, 2005), http://www.in-pharmatechnologist.com/RegulatorySafety/Sandoz-takes-issue-with-FDA-over-biogenerics.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
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attempt to foster a biosimilars market was the BPCI. It was introduced
in 2007, but was not passed until it was incorporated into the Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA), which was signed into
law by President Obama on March 23, 2010.108 Being intertwined
with the PPACA, the BPCI was in jeopardy as a result of the
controversy that ensued over the PPACA.109
Twenty-six states, private individuals, and organizations of
independent businesses collectively brought action against the federal
Health and Human Services, Treasury, and Labor Departments and
their Secretaries challenging the constitutionality of the PPACA.110
Much uncertainty ensued over whether the BPCI would survive and
whether an accelerated biologics approval process was going to
materialize.111 On June 28, 2012, however, the Supreme Court upheld
the PPACA with a 5-4 vote.112 The BPCI remains intact and life
science industry participants are examining how to move forward
with biosimilars development.113
The BPCI amended the PHS Act to implement, among other
things, an accelerated approval process for biosimilars114 through an
abbreviated drug license application under new subsection 351(k).115
108. See PPACA, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010) (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. §§ 18001-18121 (2011)).
109. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius (NFIB), 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012). The
PPACA has no severability clause, so if it is struck down, the BPCI would be struck down as
well. See Michael A. Swift, Linda D. Bentley & Kelly Davis, Biosimilar Regulations and
CMOs,
FIERCEBIOTECH
(June
26,
2012),
http://www.fiercebiotech.com/offer/baxterjune?source=baxterhouse (remarks of Kelly Davis,
Regulatory Affairs Associate Director, Baxter BioPharma Solutions, during webinar).
110. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2572.
111. During a webinar sponsored by the Intellectual Property Owners Association on
March 22, 2012, the presenters, Henry Hadad, Vice President and Deputy General Counsel of
Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., Suzanne Drennon Munck, Chief Counsel for Intellectual Property for
the Federal Trade Commission, Erika Lietzan, Partner at Covington & Burling LLP in
Washington, D.C., and Pamela Sherrid, the host of IPOA’s IP Chat Channel, were asked by
participants over the Internet for insight as to whether the BPCI would survive the constitutional
challenge of the PPACA; all presenters declined to answer or speculate. See Henry Hadad, Erika
Lietzan & Suzanne Munck, The FDA’s Guidance on Biosimilars: Understanding the Impact on
Patent Prosecution and Litigation, INTELL. PROP. OWNERS ASS’N (Mar. 22,
2012), https://ipoevents.webex.com/ec0605l/eventcenter/recording/recordAction.do?siteurl=ipoe
vents&theAction=poprecord&path=pop_program_info&recordID=6321187
(webinar
presentation).
112. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. 2566.
113. Alex Philippidis, R&D Changes Foreseen After Supreme Court Obamacare Decision,
GENETIC ENG’G & BIOTECH. NEWS (July 5, 2012), http://www.genengnews.com/insight-andintelligence/r-d-changes-foreseen-after-supreme-court-obamacare-decision/77899641/.
114. See PPACA §§ 7001-7003, 124 Stat. 804 (2010).
115. Hadad et al., supra note 111.
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Much debate ensued over what the time period for data exclusivity
should be, such that innovators can recoup the enormous R&D
expenditures required to commercialize a new drug before biosimilars
enter the market. A popular Duke study concluded it takes 12.9 to
16.2 years for innovators to break even on new biologics.116 A study
funded by Teva Pharmaceuticals, however, concluded that seven
years was sufficient.117 Scrutinizing much of this data, one
commentator suggested the appropriate balance to foster innovation
and protect investment lies in no less than 17 years.118 In its final
version, however, the BPCI provides for 12 years of data
exclusivity.119
BPCI provides for the licensing of “biosimilar” and
“interchangeable” biological products.120 A follow-on product will be
considered “biosimilar” if it is “highly similar”121 to the original
product (called the “reference product”122) and “there are no clinically
meaningful differences between the biological product and the
reference product in terms of the safety, purity, and potency of the
product.”123 A product will be considered “interchangeable” if it “can
be expected to produce the same clinical result as the reference
product in any given patient,”124 and the risk of switching the patient
from the original product to the biosimilar product is expected not to
be significantly greater, in terms of safety or diminished
effectiveness, than the risk of continuing to use the original
product.125 Approved interchangeable products “may be substituted
for the reference product without the intervention of the health care
provider who prescribed the reference product.”126 However, with
immunogenicity and interchangeability issues still unsurmounted, no

116. Henry Grabowski, Follow-On Biologics: Data Exclusivity and the Balance Between
Innovation and Competition, 7 NATURE REVS.: DRUG DISCOVERY 479, 486 (2008).
117. ALEX M. BRILL, PROPER DURATION OF DATA EXCLUSIVITY FOR GENERIC
BIOLOGICS:
A
CRITIQUE
4,
11
(2008),
available
at
http://www.tevadc.com/Brill_Exclusivity_in_Biogenerics.pdf.
118. John A. Vernon, Alan Bennett & Joseph H. Golec, Exploration of Potential
Economics of Follow-On Biologics and Implications for Data Exclusivity Periods for Biologics,
16 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 55, 71 (2010).
119. 42 U.S.C. § 262(k)(7)(A) (2011) (section 7002(a)(2) of the PPACA).
120. Id. § 262(k).
121. Id. § 262(i)(2)(A) (section 7002(b)(3) of the PPACA).
122. Id. § 262(i)(4).
123. Id. § 262(i)(2)(B).
124. Id. § 262(k)(4)(A)(ii).
125. Id. § 262(k)(4)(B).
126. Id. § 262(i)(3).
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biosimilars have been approved yet under the BPCI,127 and thus there
is still no biosimilars market in the United States.
Under continued pressure from the biotechnology industry,
regulators have struggled to clarify and solidify a meaningful
approval pathway for biosimilars. The need for a biosimilars market
is felt on four fronts: (1) the government wants it,128 (2) consumers
want it, (3) even biotech companies want it,129 and (4) the United
States is clearly behind its foreign counterparts—the European Union,
for example, has 14 biosimilars on the market.130 After much
controversy, pressure and debate, the FDA finally released initial
guidance documents on February 10, 2012 to help facilitate biosimilar
approval. The FDA even conducted a seminar on February 15, 2012,
which included experts to discuss the guidance documents with
industry participants.131 Unfortunately, concepts such as “clinically
meaningful differences” are still undefined and the best the FDA has
to offer is that it says that it wants to facilitate the biosimilars market
by meeting with developers “early and often” throughout the approval
process.132 But what constitutes “biosimilarity” will be determined
“on a case by case basis.”133 Again, the FDA offers no clarity.134
Notwithstanding, since this guidance was released the FDA has
received 35 meeting requests for proposed biosimilars on 11
undisclosed reference products, which rely on the as-yet untried FDA
guidance.135 The FDA, however, has not received any applications as
of June 26, 2012 under the new act.136

127. Biosimilar, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Biosimilar (last modified Jan. 16,
2013).
128. Congress estimates that biosimilars will save the government up to $25 billion in
healthcare spending over the next decade. See Patricia F. Dimond, What Will FDA Biosimilars
Guidelines Mean for Industry?, GENETIC ENG’G & BIOTECH. NEWS (Feb. 16, 2012),
http://www.genengnews.com/insight-and-intelligenceand153/what-will-fda-biosimilarsguidelines-mean-for-industry/77899555/.
129. The global biosimilars market is expected to range between $11-25 billion by 2020
and is very appealing to pharma and biotech companies that can successfully manufacture and
market biosimilars. See id.
130. Rachel E. Sherman, Biosimilar Biological Products, U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMIN.
(Feb. 15, 2012), https://collaboration.fda.gov/p13473376/?launcher=false&fcsContent=true&pb
Mode=normal (webinar presentation).
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. See Swift et al., supra note 109.
135. See Interview with Judi Appleman, supra note 71; Noonan & DeGuilio, supra note
52.
136. Swift et al., supra note 109.
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Legislators expect the biosimilars market to produce cost savings
through competition in a similar fashion as what occurred with the
advent of the generic drug market. While estimates of the potential
savings vary,137 the Obama Administration indicates a biosimilars
approval pathway may save the federal government $14 billion over
the next decade,138 with consumer savings between $71 billion139 and
$108 billion during this period.140 About 32 biologics may lose patent
protection by the end of 2015, which represents $51 billion in sales in
the United States.141 This offers an opportunity for a profitable
biosimilars market. However, the abbreviated process is still
undefined and too new to determine the actual benefits on the
marketplace or to the innovator or imitator. Since there is so much
uncertainty regarding drug approval for biosimilars and data
exclusivity is a more narrow protection than what patents provide, it
is likely that patenting will continue to be an effective and viable
weapon in the intellectual property fund. The next section examines
patent protection.
III. ASSESSING THE QUALITIES OF THE U.S. PATENT SYSTEM
A patent is an exchange between society and the inventor
whereby government provides a limited monopoly to the inventor in
recompense for the inventor fully disclosing the discovery, so that
society can avail itself and enjoy the benefits of the new
development.142 In the United States, once a patent is issued, the
holder is able to exclude others from making, using, having made,
selling, offering to sell, or importing anything that practices the
patented invention.143 A patent does not give an inventor an absolute
right to practice the invention; it grants only the right to exclude
others. Exploitation by the owner depends on whether others have
patents that overlap the invention’s subject matter and whether the
practice of the invention is subject to other existing laws.

137. JOHNSON, supra note 12, at 4.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Tumulty, supra note 7.
141. MEDCO, supra note 86, at 53.
142. See id.
143. 35 U.S.C. § 262 (2011) (“Joint owners. In the absence of any agreement to the
contrary, each of the joint owners of a patent may make, use, offer to sell, or sell the patented
invention within the United States, or import the patented invention into the United States,
without the consent of and without accounting to the other owners.”).
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A. Patent Terms in Pharmaceuticals and Biotechnology
Subject to successful prosecution and payment of applicable
fees, patents are effective and enforceable beginning on the date on
which the patent is issued by the United States Patent and Trademark
Office (USPTO) and ending 20 years from the date on which the
application for the patent was filed in the United States (or an earlier
application if the application contains a specific reference to an earlier
filed application).144 A December 2011 report indicated that the
average time for a patent to issue was 33.7 months,145 or just shy of
three years. Other commentators indicate the average time for
prosecution of a U.S. patent is 3.4 years, but the average period for a
biotech patent is 4.4. years.146 Assuming four years for prosecution,
upon issuance a biotech patent has 16 years of effectiveness.
As noted earlier, however, clinical trials may take over six years
to complete, and FDA approval may take another year or two.147 In
addition, upon approval various steps toward commercialization need
to be taken, and thus a substantial portion of patent life may lapse
before the drug reaches the market. As also noted, there is some
availability for limited patent term extension to accommodate some of
the time spent pursuing FDA approval.148 Nonetheless, even with
extensions, as of 2010 the average effective patent life of a new drug
is 11.7 years.149 Hence, the BPCI provides for 12 years of data
exclusivity. These figures for patent terms are, of course, averages. It
is possible, for example, if a patent is prosecuted quickly and a new
drug emerges from FDA approval quickly, one might enjoy a patent
term of 17 years. The converse is also true: if patent prosecution
and/or drug approval are protracted, there may be very little patent
term remaining for a drug upon approval. Thus, while data exclusivity
is a fixed period from the date of drug approval, the remaining term
144. Id. § 154(a)(2).
145. Jim Singer, How Long Does Patent and Trademark Prosecution Take? (2011
Update), IP SPOTLIGHT (Dec. 14, 2011), http://ipspotlight.com/2011/12/14/1780/.
146. Dennis S. Fernandez & James T. Huie, Strategic Balancing of Patent and FDA
Approval Processes to Maximize Market Exclusivity, 7 ASIA PAC. BIOTECH NEWS 998, 998
(2003), available at http://www.iploft.com/PTO-FDA.pdf.
147. DiMasi & Grabowski, supra note 60, at 475.
148. 35 U.S.C. § 156. The Hatch-Waxman Act allows for restoration of half the time spent
in clinical trials and the full time spent by the FDA during final approval, up to five years, but
caps the maximum patent life after restoration at 14 years, so the full five year restoration is not
available if the drug developer retains a patent term of greater than nine years prior to patent
term extension under the Hatch-Waxman Act.
149. Henry G. Grabowski & John M. Vernon, Effective Patent Life in Pharmaceuticals, 19
INT’L J. TECH. MGMT. 98, 116 (2000).
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for any patents issued on such drug will vary from case to case.
B. Reasons for Patenting
Why do inventors and their employers file for patents? There are
many reasons for seeking a patent, assuming the discovery or
innovation satisfies the subject matter criteria for patentability. A
number of widely recognized reasons for patenting are: (1) patent
holders can sell products at higher than marginal costs; (2) patents can
prevent competition and allow a holder to maintain supernormal
profits; (3) patents allow an inventor to utilize litigation as a tool for
enforcement; (4) some implement a “defensive” patenting strategy,
using patents to stop infringement suits through counterclaiming or by
lodging prior art to invalidate another’s patent or prevent another
from getting a patent issued; (5) patents are used as strategic
“bargaining” chips, for example, in cross-licensing negotiations
where the one with fewer patents often pays licensing fees to the
holder of the most patents; (6) patents are viewed as valuable assets
and help secure financing and investment, especially for smaller
companies, which, in turn, funds R&D efforts; (7) as valuable assets,
patents increase the value of a company for exit strategies, such as for
an initial public offering (IPO), an acquisition, or liquidation; (8)
patents may allow a company to gain access to a competitor’s
technology through the threat value of the incumbent’s patents versus
the entrant’s technologies or patents, sometimes called “patent
bullying;” (9) some implement a strategy of deploying “blocking
patents” to stop evolution of others’ technology, which might also
include patent suppression to prevent a technology from developing;
(10) patents have a cache for marketing, where even the “patent
pending” moniker appeals to consumers; and (11) patents may
increase one’s reputation in an industry or simply satisfy vanity
interests.150
C. Shortcomings of the U.S. Patent System
Commentators have noted that the U.S. patent system is deficient
in at least four serious ways.151 The first criticism is that the USPTO
issues patents too freely, resulting in patents issued with various
150. Ted Sichelman, Professor of Law, Patent Law Policy Class Lecture at the University
of San Diego School of Law (Jan. 24, 2012) (on file with author).
151. Ted Sichelman, The Vonage Trilogy: A Case Study in “Patent Bullying” 3 (San
Diego Legal Studies Paper No. 11-057, 2011), [hereinafter Patent Bullying] available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1856703. See generally Ted Sichelman,
Commercializing Patents, 62 STAN. L. REV. 341 (2009) [hereinafter Commercializing Patents].
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problems in the patent claims. Some contain claims that are
anticipated or obvious in light of preexisting inventions.152 Some
claims are considered overly broad in relation to the disclosures
contained in the specification of the patent.153 Other claims are either
vague and ambiguous or are otherwise hard to understand.154 There
are also claims that are introduced or amended years after the original
patent application was filed.155 The problem with copious “bad”
patents is that once a patent is issued, it carries with it a presumption
of validity. To challenge this presumption requires litigation to
invalidate the patent, which may cost, on average, a million dollars or
more.156
A second defect in the U.S. patent system is that there are
excessively high transaction costs involved with litigation and
negotiating licenses for patent rights.157 These transaction costs are
largely the result of widespread uncertainty and variability in various
patent law principles.158 These costs can be particularly distorted in
fields where it is difficult to search for or analyze patents.159 Many
critics of the U.S. patent system remark that patent boundaries are
hidden, unclear, or unpredictable and that, since infringement lawsuits
are usually filed against firms exploiting new technologies, innovators
are exposed to excessive risk of inadvertent infringement.160
A third problem is that patent holders can assert their rights at
their discretion. This may not sound problematic on its face, but some
patent holders will wait until a particular market is more developed
before asserting their rights, allowing infringement to occur and
persist while the market develops and participants become
accustomed to certain technologies. Then, when the patent owner
steps up, the purported and often innocent infringers may incur

152. Sichelman, Patent Bullying, supra note 151, at 3.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 3-4.
158. Id. at 4.
159. Id. See also Sichelman, Commercializing Patents, supra note 151, at 385-87
(discussing substantial transaction costs inventors face in light of broad patent claims).
160. JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: HOW JUDGES,
BUREAUCRATS, AND LAWYERS PUT INNOVATORS AT RISK 14 (2008); see also FED. TRADE
COMM’N REPORT, THE EVOLVING IP MARKETPLACE: ALIGNING PATENT NOTICE AND
REMEDIES
WITH
COMPETITION
75-76
(2011),
available
at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2011/03/110307patentreport.pdf.
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exorbitant costs in substituting a non-infringing technology.161
A fourth deficiency is that different players in patent litigation
have widely disparate resources, stakes and levels of risk aversion.162
For example, non-practicing entities (NPEs, often called “patent
trolls”), large patent holders, and startup companies each have
disparate interests and resources in comparison to one another when
lawsuits ensue. These inequalities sometime cause highly
disproportionate litigation outcomes.163
Nonetheless, the frequency of patent litigation has tripled since
the 1980s.164 Despite this, profits associated with worldwide patents
in the chemical and pharmaceutical industries far exceed the average
cost of litigation to alleged infringers in the United States.165 Thus
despite increased litigation costs, patents appear to maintain
significant value in the chemical and pharma fields. These, along with
other indicators, suggest that the U.S. patent system still provides
positive incentives for chemical and pharmaceutical inventors to
innovate.166
These indicators diverge, however, as to small-molecule
chemical drugs versus biologics. The uniqueness of a specific small
molecule may be more easily demonstrated than the complexity of a
biologic. That is, when trying to prove infringement, it is easier to
show another small molecule is identical to the innovator’s patented
material. In contrast, because of the complexity of large biologic
molecules and differences in manufacturing processes, one biologic
likely has a different structure than a similar biologic, and, in turn,
may display different properties. In this regard, chemical drug patents
might provide stronger exclusion because they are more likely to be
successfully enforced. In other words, it is easier to determine
whether a competitor’s chemical drug infringes. For biologics,
however, structural differences may not only be different enough to
avoid infringement, but they might give rise to different properties or
bioactivity in the body, whereby those different features may be
patentable in their own right.
161. See Ted Sichelman, Purging Patent Law of “Private Law” Remedies 21-23 (San
Diego Legal Studies, Working Paper No. 11-077, Sept. 23, 2011), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1932834.
162. See generally Stuart J.H. Graham & Ted Sichelman, Why Do Start-Ups Patent?, 23
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1063 (2008).
163. See id. at 1080-81.
164. BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 160, at 17.
165. Id. at 15-16.
166. Id. at 16, 27.
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Furthermore, the patent specification must be sufficient to
inform a person having ordinary skill in the art (PHOSITA) how to
make and use the patented subject matter for its intended purpose.167
This enablement requirement presents a unique problem for biologic
inventions because they involve living materials, whereby a written
account with a complete description may be insufficient to enable
others to make and use the biological invention.168 The enablement
requirement has been interpreted to require the patent specification to
provide enough information such that a PHOSITA may make and use
the claimed invention without undue experimentation.169
Manufacturing processes vary and some of the finer details of a
manufacturer’s process are often closely guarded trade secrets.170 If a
subsequent PHOSITA is unable to reliably reproduce the biologics
product without access to additional information or without undue
experimentation, then the patent may not be enabling and by
definition be invalid.171
A unique patent implication that arises from the complexity of
biologics is the “sweet spot” phenomena, whereby a biologic is
similar enough for accelerated approval, but not identical for purposes
of patent infringement.172 Being in such a place would allow an
imitator to enjoy the best of both worlds: accelerated drug approval
without patent infringement. Other challenges the biotech industry
faces with regard to the patent system will be discussed further below.
D. New Challenges for the Technology Industry with the
America Invents Act
The America Invents Act (AIA) was signed into law by
President Obama on September 16, 2011, with certain components

167. The enablement requirement is embodied in 35 U.S.C. § 112(a) (2011) (“The
specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and of the manner and process
of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person
skilled in the art . . . to make and use the same . . . .”).
168. THOMAS, supra note 63, at 208.
169. Atlas Powder Co. v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 750 F.2d 1569, 1576-77 (Fed.
Cir. 1984).
170. BIO Principles on Follow-On Biologics, BIOTECH. INDUS. ORG. (Jan. 18, 2008),
http://www.bio.org/articles/bio-principles-follow-biologics.
171. See Gregory N. Mandel, The Generic Biologics Debate: Industry’s Unintended
Admission That Biotech Patents Fail Enablement, 11 VA. J.L. & TECH. 1, 24 (2006).
172. David S. Harper, Partner, McDonnell Boehnen Hulbert & Berghoff LLP, Presentation
at the Association of University Technology Managers’ Annual Meeting: Follow-On Biologics
(Mar. 1, 2011).
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yet to become effective.173 The AIA is the subject of considerable
controversy and debate of its own, which will not be covered in this
article. Some commentators propose that technology companies will
be subjected to an unprecedented wave of patent lawsuits that will
stifle innovation.174 Others argue the AIA may prevent startups from
raising the capital required to commercialize their inventions.175
Opponents of the AIA contend that venture funding may be diverted
to less risky investments.176 Some suggest that a startup that relies on
patents for protection from competitive risk will lose certain
protections available today, protection that allow them to gather the
capital, strategic partners, and time for R&D and testing.177 In
addition, critics indicate that startups exposed to the risk of copying
by more established companies will be unable to attract venture
capital, and so will lack the financial resources necessary to
commercialize their inventions and grow their companies.178
Whether any of this is true remains to be seen. For purposes of
this article, it is simply noted that the AIA introduces new dubiety
into an already murky patent system. Nevertheless, since there is so
much uncertainty regarding drug approval for biosimilars and data
exclusivity is a more narrow protection than what patents provide, it
is likely that patenting will continue to be an effective and sustainable
defense in the fight for intellectual property.
IV. COMPARISON OF DATA EXCLUSIVITY WITH PATENTING
Some commentators suggest that data exclusivity periods are
more important and more effective in protecting intellectual property
173. See Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011); Ted
Sichelman, Professor of Law, Patent Law Policy Class Lecture at the University of San Diego
School of Law (Feb. 7, 2012) (on file with author).
174. See, e.g., Tracie L. Bryant, The America Invents Act: Slaying Trolls, Limiting Joinder,
25 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 673, 675-76 (2012); Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, WIKIPEDIA,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Leahy-Smith_America_Invents_Act (last modified Jan. 12, 2013);
Matthew Yglesias, America’s Patent Crisis, SLATE (July 5, 2012, 4:49 PM),
http://www.slate.com/articles/business/small_business/2012/07/patents_innovation_and_the_am
erica_invents_act_how_a_new_law_encouraging_more_efficient_patent_processing_could_stifl
e_american_innovation_.html.
175. See Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, supra note 174; Eric Savitz, New Patent Law
Means Trouble for Tech Entrepreneurs, FORBES (Sept. 20, 2011, 4:04 PM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/ciocentral/2011/09/20/new-patent-law-means-trouble-for-techentrepreneurs/.
176. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, supra note 174.
177. Id.
178. Gary M. Lauder, Venture Capital—The Buck Stops Where?, 2 MED. INNOVATION &
BUS. 14, 14–19 (2010).
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for biotech companies than the patent regime.179 Some predict that
biotech firms will come to rely more on data exclusivity over
patenting their inventions to protect their competitive advantages.180
Admittedly, the patent system is far from perfect and has its own host
of issues and uncertainties. Regardless, however, the drug approval
process and the patent system each provide very different benefits to
biotech firms, even if some of the impact of these regimes produces
similar effects in protecting one’s space in the marketplace.
The debate over data exclusivity periods has been particularly
significant because of what some commentators view as a critical
examination of the effectiveness of patent law in advancing
technology.181 Some suggest recent Supreme Court decisions reflect a
movement towards narrowing patent protections.182
Data exclusivity provides the holder of an approved NDA
limited protection from new competition in the marketplace for the
innovation embodied in the newly approved drug.183 Exclusivity is
available for new chemical entities (NCEs), which are by definition
innovative, and for significant changes in already approved drug
products, such as a new use.184
As noted earlier, the abbreviated drug approval process expressly
permits the FDA to rely on data not developed by the applicant.185
This could be published literature or the FDA’s finding of safety and
effectiveness of the innovator’s previously approved drug.186 Data
exclusivity operates in two ways: (1) it precludes approval of certain
applications under section 505(b)(2) of the FD&C Act and certain
abbreviated new drug applications (ANDAs) for prescribed periods of
time,187 and (2) it delays the submission of section 505(b)(2)
applications and ANDAs for certain periods of time.188
179. See Morgan, supra note 90, at 93.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. See id.
184. Tam, supra note 87, at 553.
185. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(2) (2011).
186. See id.
187. See id. A 505(b)(2) application is one for which one or more of the investigations
relied upon by the applicant for approval “were not conducted by or for the applicant and for
which the applicant has not obtained a right of reference or use from the person by or for whom
the investigations were conducted.”
188. Small Business Assistance: Frequently Asked Questions for New Drug Product
Exclusivity,
U.S.
FOOD
&
DRUG
ADMIN.,
http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/DevelopmentApprovalProcess/SmallBusinessAssistance/ucm069962.
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Essentially, the FDA may not approve another application for a
drug for which the investigations described in the application and
relied upon by the applicant (here, an imitator) for approval of the
application were not conducted by or for the applicant, and for which
the applicant has not obtained a right of reference or use from the
originator for whom the investigations were originally conducted.189
This last concept is important in that an imitator could procure a right
of reference or use from the originator by either purchasing the data
or licensing the rights to use, and thereby rely on the data much akin
to licensing the rights to practice under another’s patent. Data
exclusivity and patenting are similar in this fashion, but they differ in
significant ways.
A. Scope and Predictability
Two major differences between data exclusivity and patents are
the scope of protection and its predictability. The scope of patents
may be narrowing, as some commentators suggest,190 and the greater
number of patents that get issued in a particular field the narrower the
ultimate claims might be when patents are issued; but a patent still has
the potential of covering a much broader scope than data exclusivity.
As noted above, data exclusivity protects a newly approved drug
against a generic or a biosimilar—essentially, a competitor with the
same type of drug. Data exclusivity might also protect a significant
improvement or new use, but, again, it would only protect against an
imitator seeking approval for that same improvement or use. A patent,
however, may have far greater reach, depending on the interpretation
of the scope of its claims.
A prominent, and probably extreme example, is U.S. Patent No.
4,528,643 (‘643 patent), issued in 1985, which was for a kiosk that
produced digital audio tapes in retails stores. The owner, E-Data, was
successful in enforcing its patent against a host of e-commerce
businesses.191 E-commerce was not only a different technology, but
did not even exist when ‘643 patent was issued. The Court of
Appeals, however, concluded in 2001 that the “point of sale location”
covering E-Data’s kiosks also included bedrooms, offices, and
anywhere else with an Internet connection.192 The scope of the ‘643
htm (last visited Jan. 21, 2012).
189. See 21 C.F.R. 314.3 (2012); see also FD&C § 505(b)(2).
190. Morgan, supra note 90, at 93.
191. BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 160, at 2.
192. Id. at 9.

ROTH

280

2/28/2013 10:29 AM

SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J.

[Vol. 29

patent was unforeseen when issued and unpredicted before this ruling.
Data exclusivity, however, has no unpredictable scope: it protects the
data of the innovator held by the FDA. Even market exclusivity is
predictable in scope: the FDA will not approve a generic or biosimilar
for the indication, or treatment, for which approval is granted. Thus
patents have the ability to protect a much broader area than data
exclusivity.
Moreover, while market exclusivity—a patent—is a complete
bar to competition, data exclusivity is not. A patent might prohibit
one from practicing the scope of the patent during its term, but data
exclusivity only precludes an imitator from relying on the innovator’s
clinical trial data. An imitator motivated enough to expend the
resources may still compete if it has the wherewithal to conduct its
own clinical trials. In fact, this behavior had already occurred before
the BPCI was enacted. Despite the absence of an abbreviated
approval process for biosimilars, six generic manufactures of HGH
were able to obtain regulatory approval from the FDA by conducting
their own comprehensive clinical trials.193 Thus even the “continuous
data exclusivity” that persisted did not prevent these competitors from
entering the market. Such comprehensive clinical trial efforts were
likely wasteful and redundant, and may be remedied if the new FDA
guidance on biologics leads to accelerated approvals. Nonetheless,
this behavior underscores a limitation of data exclusivity protection.
B. Preexisting Competition
Patent protection begins upon the USPTO issuing a patent.
Arguably and to a lesser extent, a company simply touting an
innovation or discovery as “patent pending” might also create some
modest deterring effect and thus provide some measure of protection
even before a patent is issued. However, having a patent does not
necessarily prevent another from engaging in what might constitute
infringing conduct. In fact, another entity might already be infringing
one’s patent even before or upon the issuance of the patent, whereby
the patent holder might immediately file suit for infringement.
Data exclusivity, however, arises upon approval of a new drug,
and by the drug being new there is no analogous “infringement.” This
is so because another company cannot legally commercialize a drug
in the United States without first procuring FDA approval, which
193. See Henry Grabowski, Ian Cockburn & Genia Long, The Market for Follow-On
Biologics: How Will It Evolve?, 25 HEALTH AFF. 1291, 1293-94 (2006), available at
http://content.healthaffairs.org/content/25/5/1291.full.html.
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constitutes a license to market the drug. Selling drugs is a very
complex business with other factors at play in addition to FDA
approval, such as approval for reimbursement by medical plans,
approval for listing on doctors’ formularies so that doctors are aware
of the availability of the drug, and acceptance in the medical
community of the drug for treatment of either its approved use or an
“off-label” use. With these and other considerations present, the
barriers to entry are so high that competition for the newly approved
drug may be minimal and perhaps nonexistent, whereas with a
patented product, competition or infringement may already exist in
the marketplace.
C. Passive versus Proactive
Another difference between data exclusivity and patenting is that
data exclusivity is automatic. The innovator does not have to do
anything—a passive characteristic. Upon drug approval, the innovator
is already entitled to protection of its data and, indeed, the FDA will
not allow an imitator to rely on the innovator’s data in introducing a
competing product. Furthermore, no additional cost is required to
enjoy data exclusivity.
Patents, however, require affirmative action on the part of the
patent holder: efforts to prosecute patent applications and enforce
issued patent (which could possibly lead to expensive, complex, and
uncertain litigation to guard against infringers)—proactive behavior.
Nonetheless, despite costly litigation, worldwide profits on patents in
the chemical and pharmaceutical industries exceed the aggregate cost
of litigation in the United States against alleged infringers.194 One
commentator indicated that in 2000 the aggregate cost of U.S. patent
litigation was just over $4 billion, while worldwide profits on patents
were about $15 billion.195
D. Patent Thickets versus Downstream Reward
Another area where the utility of the patent system has been
questioned is the “patent thickets” problem. The pharma and biotech
industries are generally seen as areas where the financial value of the
limited monopolies that patents offer is a key incentive for innovation
of new products.196 In 1980, however, the University and Small
Business Patent Procedures Act (the Bayh-Dole Act) was passed to
194.
195.
196.

BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 160, at 15-16.
Id. at 15.
Morgan, supra note 90, at 101.
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encourage universities and other recipients of federal research funds
to patent their R&D.197 This has caused a proliferation of intellectual
property rights in what is called “upstream” bioscience research that
in the past was freely available and in the public domain for
innovators to use. This research is now often tied up by patent holders
and requires licensing of multiple patents from various upstream
sources.198
This “patent thicket” is a phenomenon where multiple patent
holders each have the right to exclude others from using a portion of
the common information pool. Thus, because of transaction costs and
strategic considerations, the rights to the information pool will not be
allocated efficiently to allow for optimum use.199 This creates
significant pressure on downstream developers by way of search
costs, licensing transaction costs, hold-up problems, and royaltystacking problems.200 Data exclusivity, on the other hand, does not
bear this problem because it is designed to reward successful endproduct development. The payoff—i.e., the license the FDA issues by
approving a drug—focuses on the downstream effort: successful
completion of the approval process.
E. Financial Considerations
The total cost for issuance of one patent for a startup biotech
company ranges from $52,000 to $62,000.201 This appears small in
comparison to the overall costs of drug development, but biologics
developers face considerably higher costs enforcing patents. HatchWax itself, as noted above, has provisions that encourage generic
providers to challenge the validity of innovators’ patents. The BPCI
has similar provisions.202 The patent system’s ability to serve as an
incentive to innovation is undoubtedly impacted when one has to
consider whether to pursue these lawsuits and risk patent invalidation
197. Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The
Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCIENCE 698, 698 (1998), available at
http://www.sciencemag.org/content/280/5364/698.full.
198. Id. at 698-701.
199. Id.
200. Morgan, supra note 90, at 102-03.
201. Ted Sichelman, Professor of Law, Patent Law Policy Class Lecture at the University
of San Diego School of Law (Feb. 14, 2012) (on file with author).
202. See BPCI § 351(l)(1)(D) (explaining that the applicant seeking accelerated approval
must provide information to the innovator sufficient for the innovator to determine “whether a
claim of patent infringement could reasonably be asserted if the subsection (k) applicant
engaged in the manufacture, use, offering for sale, sale, or importation into the United States of
the biological product that is the subject of the application under subsection (k)”).
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or enter into costly reverse-payment settlements with generic
challengers.203 A lawsuit to invalidate a patent typically costs a
million dollars or more.204
The biotech industry has expressed concern that patent
protection is narrower for biologics than pharmaceuticals because
imitators can more easily design around patents to avoid
infringement.205 Some commentators suggest that utilizing FDA
exclusivity as the primary motivator for innovation may entirely
eliminate the costs of litigation and patent challenges and
uncertainties with patenting.206 Such logic is naïve because it ignores
the possibility that an innovator that relies solely on data exclusivity
and has no patents may still be subject to patent suits by others who
might claim the innovator infringes their patents. Such an innovator
would be at a disadvantage because it would have no patents to assert
back against the aggressor.
Furthermore, while data exclusivity is part and parcel of the
FDA approval process, and thus has no added cost, the FDA approval
process alone is very expensive in comparison to patenting. As noted
earlier, the average cost of bringing a new biologic to market is $1.2
billion207 and the simple generic hypothetical showed an innovator
spending $12.6 million on clinical trials with an imitator spending
only $2.6 million on clinical trials, if able to use an accelerated
approval process. Assuming the cost of obtaining a patent is on the
high end of the $52,000-$62,000 range, and a hypothetical developer
has three patents covering various aspects of a particular drug, the
budget for the patent portfolio would be $186,000. This, of course,
does not take into consideration any costs incurred with potential
patent infringement. Regardless of whether one uses the hypothetical
average cost of $1.2 billion for a new biologic or $12.6 million just
for clinical trials, the costs of patenting is such a small fraction: only
1.5% of a $12.6 million budget, and unnoticeable in a budget of $1.2
billion.
Going beyond just this simple hypothetical, it might be helpful to
examine the cost of actual patent portfolios against the average new
203. Morgan, supra note 90, at 104.
204. Sichelman, Patent Bullying, supra note 151, at 3.
205. See BIOTECH. INDUS. ORG., A FOLLOW-ON BIOLOGICS REGIME WITHOUT STRONG
DATA EXCLUSIVITY WILL STIFLE THE DEVELOPMENT OF NEW MEDICINES 3-4 (2007), available
at http://bio-org.preview.interworks.com/articles/follow-biologics-regime-without-strong-dataexclusivity-will-stifle-development.
206. Morgan, supra note 90, at 104.
207. Average Cost to Develop a New Biotechnology Product Is $1.2 Billion, supra note 1.
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biologics price tag of $1.2 billion. Some commentators conducted a
study in 2008 through the Berkeley Center for Law and Technology
on patenting behaviors of startup companies whereby they received
responses form 1,332 unique companies.208 This study gathered
results from two populations: one set of companies through Dun &
Bradstreet (D&B) and another set through venture capital (VC)
resources. In that study, the D&B companies in biotechnology
demonstrated an average cost of patenting of $52,000209 and an
average number of patents held by each company as 9.7.210 This
translates into a budget of $504,400 for the entire patent portfolio for
the average biotech startup in this group. The VC companies reported
average cost of patenting of $62,000211 and an average number of
patents and applications held as 34.6.212 This reflects a total budget of
$2,145,200 for the patent portfolio of the average biotech startup in
this study.
Even at the high end of $2,145,200, the entire patent portfolio
cost is still a mere pittance, less than 0.2% of a drug development
budget of $1.2 billion. While the patent system may not be perfect, it
seems that such a relatively small dollar amount would indicate that,
if an aspect of a drug product was patentable, the developer likely
would—or at least ought to—seek patent protection.
F. Effects on Innovation
Another criticism of the patent system in the biologics world is
that reliance on patenting deters innovators from investing R&D
efforts into unpatentable drugs. This may be true. The biotech
industry, particularly as to small companies, relies on patents as a
source of fund raising.213 Small biotech companies play an important
role in filling the innovation space between the research conducted at
universities and the product development being done at large firms.214
The United States has over 1,500 biotechnology companies, most of
which are relatively small.215 Small biotech companies often depend
208. Stuart J.H. Graham & Ted Sichelman, Patenting by High Technology Entrepreneurs,
in CREATIVITY, LAW AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP 156, 157, 162 (Shubha Ghosh & Robin P.
Malloy eds., 2011).
209. Sichelman, supra note 201.
210. Graham & Sichelman, supra note 208, at 165 tbl. 9.1.
211. Sichelman, supra note 201.
212. Graham & Sichelman, supra note 208, at 165 tbl. 9.1.
213. Id. at 170-72.
214. See Grabowski et al., supra note 193, at 1294.
215. David M. Dudzinski, Reflections on Historical, Scientific, and Legal Issues Relevant
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on their patent portfolios to attract venture financing and equity
capital.216
It is likely that unpatentable drugs in a small company’s
development pipeline would be less attractive to investors (and more
specifically to venture capital) than a more robust patent portfolio.
Regardless of whether a biologic is patentable, it might still be a
viable therapeutic with significant commercial and social value. If
reliance on data exclusivity increases, it likely would cause drug
developers to view unpatentable therapeutics as more appealing
endeavors.
If reliance on data exclusivity causes a decrease in reliance on
patents for protection, some commentators wonder whether
innovation at the small biotech level would be impaired. While this
argument may be plausible, and on its face intuitive, it neglects the
fact that not all companies rely on patent protection.
That same 2008 Berkeley study revealed several reasons why
startup companies chose not to patent certain inventions. Some
reasons for not patenting were: (1) not wanting to disclose the
invention, (2) cost of filing, (3) ease of competitors inventing around,
(4) a belief that trade secret protection was adequate, (5) the cost of
enforcing, (6) a belief that the invention was not patentable, and (7) a
belief that the invention did not need protection.217 Those results
demonstrated that small biotech companies already have a number of
reasons why they do not pursue patents. The availability of FDA data
exclusivity may be just one more reason they might choose not to
patent.
G. Incongruent Terms
Another difference is the incongruence between the terms of
each system. As noted above, data exclusivity is for a specific period
running from the date of drug approval. A patent’s term, however,
runs for a period of 20 years from the date of filing, regardless of
when the patent issues (assuming it issues at all) and regardless of
when or if drug approval occurs. These terms are clearly
asynchronous. This is not to suggest these periods should be

to Designing Approval Pathways for Generic Versions of Recombinant Protein-Based
Therapeutics and Monoclonal Antibodies, 60 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 143, 178 (2005). A biotech
company may also be considered “small” under the definition the USPTO uses for small patent
filers, which is a company of 500 or fewer employees. See 13 C.F.R. §§ 121.801-.805 (2012).
216. Morgan, supra note 90, at 110.
217. Graham & Sichelman, supra note 208, at 173-74.
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harmonized; these protections will cover different periods and
whether one is more dominant in providing protection will differ from
case to case. Thus one cannot conclude based on time frames alone
that patenting or data exclusivity is superior over the other.
H. Public versus Proprietary
One difference between the FDA approval process and the patent
system that appears to have garnered little conversation is that the
patent system is designed to foster complete disclosure of the
invention such that a person having ordinary skill in the art can
practice the invention. At present there is no comparable requirement
with the FDA. The FDA treats clinical trial data as proprietary218 to
the innovator that submits it under application for approval, and it is
not subject to disclosure.219 This may further lend credibility to the
argument that an increase in reliance on data exclusivity might focus
more attention on unpatentable drugs.
This also seems to suggest that if patent prosecution is
questionable—that is, a patent might not issue—or if a drug developer
believes it has valuable trade secrets that it would not want disclosed
through the patent system, an innovator would retain trade secret
protection by pursuing drug approval through the FDA alone. This is
especially true in a risky situation where a patent might not ultimately
issue, yet the invention will be disclosed when the application
publishes. The trade secrets would then be forfeited as a result of
public disclosure, with no patent protection to follow, thereby
jeopardizing intellectual property value.
Data exclusivity has its protective features, but patents clearly
have different and broader protections. Table 1 shows a number of
characteristics of data exclusivity side by side with patenting
discussed here. This helps to illustrate at a glance the few similarities
they share, but how different these protections are. Since there is so
much uncertainty regarding drug approval for biosimilars and data
exclusivity is a more narrow protection than what patents provide, it
is likely that patenting will continue to be an effective and viable
weapon in the intellectual property arsenal.
218. See 21 U.S.C. § 331 (2011) (“The following acts and the causing thereof are
prohibited: . . . (j) The using by any person to his own advantage, or revealing, other than to the
Secretary or officers or employees of the Department, or to the courts when relevant in any
judicial proceeding under this chapter, any information acquired . . . concerning any method or
process which as a trade secret is entitled to protection . . . .”).
219. See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, The Role of the FDA in Innovation Policy, 13 MICH.
TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 345, 380 (2007).
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Table 1. Comparison Between Characteristics of Data Exclusivity
and Patents

CRITERIA

COMPARISON
DATA EXCLUSIVITY

PATENTS

Decision-making

No choice

Must decide early (one year) but
can forego

Becomes effective

Automatic

Requires effort to prosecute

Effort required

Passive

Proactive

Focus on protection

Downstream reward

Upstream—patent thickets

Outcomes

Predictable

Uncertain

Coverage

Single product

Possibly multiple
products/processes

Scope

Narrow scope—specific Rx*;
specific Tx**

Broad scope (potentially)

Approach

Single strategy—protects
only your data

Multiple strategies can be
deployed***

Value

Undetermined value

Valuable for
fundraising/investment

Intersection with
competition

Precedes competition

Possible preexisting competition

Cost of protection

No additional cost (but Rx
approval expensive)

$52K-$62K each

Effect on innovation

Encourages innovation†

Encourages innovation
(chemical/pharma)†

Duration

Term runs 12 years from Rx
approval

Term runs 20 years from filing (+
extension)

Information

Proprietary (+ regulatory
impracticality)

Public

†
*
**
***

similar characteristic
Rx—medical shorthand for “drug”
Tx—medical shorthand for “treatment”
Litigation as a tool; defensive strategies (counterclaiming, lodging prior art,
etc.); bargaining chips; bullying (gaining access to competitor’s technology);
blocking strategies; cache/reputation
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V. REGULATORY IMPRACTICALITY—AN IMPEDIMENT TO
BIOSIMILARS
In exploring the nature of FDA data exclusivity in relation to the
patent system, a few characteristics have surfaced that indicate a
barrier to entry that has gone unaddressed. There are gaps in
legislation: the BPCI, for example, has terse, limited and unclear
definitions. With limitations in today’s science and no practical access
to innovators’ manufacturing processes, the industry also lacks
mechanisms to effectively develop biosimilars. These circumstances
amount to an obstacle to entering the biosimilar market. The effect of
these impediments seems to dangle on the fringes of dialogue among
commentators and industry professionals without really being
articulated or acknowledged. This concept is referred to here as
“regulatory impracticality.”
As noted earlier, manufacturers often maintain aspects of their
manufacturing processes as trade secrets. Moreover, all application
materials, including manufacturing processes and test results from
trials, are kept proprietary when submitted to the FDA. It is true that
the law allows an applicant to rely on information for approval that
was “not conducted by or for the applicant and for which the
applicant has not obtained a right of reference or use.”220 Yet although
the current law permits an imitator to rely on the innovator’s clinical
trial data, the law does not provide a mechanism for the imitator to get
that data. The FDC&A allows the FDA to rely on data not developed
by the imitator, which the FDA has in its coffers, but because this
data is proprietary, the FDA cannot share it and an imitator has no
access to it.221 An overlooked circumstance is that access to an
innovator’s data is highly unlikely to occur because an innovator has
no motivation to voluntarily cooperate with an imitator. Therefore,
the biosimilar developer does not know and will not know what the
data is in order to make use of it and reference it. This is an aspect of
regulatory impracticality.
Because biologics are so complex, the imitator necessarily needs
to know the innovator’s manufacturing process in order to determine
how similar or different that process is to the imitator’s.222 Otherwise
the imitator has no way of assessing or predicting, if it can, how
220. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(2) (2011).
221. Telephone Interview with David Harper, Partner, McDonnell Boehnen Hulbert &
Berghoff LLP (Mar. 14, 2012).
222. Interview with Wei Chen, Chief Scientific Officer, Phage Pharmaceuticals, Inc., in
San Diego, Cal. (Mar. 7, 2012).
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similar the structure of its product might be as compared to the
innovator.223 This has not been an issue in the small-molecule,
chemical world. Because of the simplicity of their molecular
structures, different manufacturing processes can still arrive at an
identical compound, thus achieving structural identity. However,
because of the size and complexity involved with biologics, not
knowing how the product is made is an impediment in developing a
biosimilar.224 The regulatory regime has not accounted for this issue,
which makes it impractical for companies to rely on another’s data to
effectively develop biosimilars, thus creating regulatory
impracticality.
The current regulatory environment has also failed to provide a
meaningful pathway to develop a biosimilar, which contributes to
regulatory impracticality. Even with the FDA’s recently released
guidance documents, webinar, and teleconference, vague terms in the
statute like “highly similar” and “no clinically meaningful
differences” remain undefined. 225 Worse, they are hardly enhanced
by the FDA with its further bewildering and imprecise guidance: that
accelerated approval will be considered under the “totality of the
evidence” on a “case by case basis.”226 The BPCI does not require
FDA guidance,227 and what guidance the FDA provided is still in draft
form. The industry awaits “final” guidance from the FDA to
implement the BPCI.228 Thus unlike the small-molecule approval
process, where reduced clinical trial activity (and concomitant cost
savings) can be anticipated, a biosimilar developer has no idea at this
time how much clinical trial activity the FDA will require in order to
demonstrate biosimilarity.229 Furthermore, even though the FDA
indicates it wishes to interact with biosimilar developers “early and
often” during the drug approval process,230 the current state of science
does not have mechanisms for one to prove immunogenicity and
interchangeability without clinical trials.231 A biosimilar developer
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. Sherman, supra note 130.
226. Id.
227. Swift et al., supra note 109.
228. Philippidis, supra note 113.
229. Noonan & DeGuilio, supra note 52 (noting that the FDA has provided no clarity on
the extent of evidence or criteria applied).
230. Sherman, supra note 130.
231. Noonan & DeGuilio, supra note 52 (noting that the proposed rules still fall short of
providing a clear understanding of the best way to develop this market and further noting the
FDA has provided no specific guidance on biosimilarity assays or preferred ranges for
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cannot predict how much or how little testing may be required and
thus cost savings and time to accelerated approval cannot be
estimated.232 Again, the regulatory environment does not provide a
clear pathway—another characteristic of regulatory impracticality.
Innovators may be on more sure footing in that regulatory
impracticality prevents or at least delays development of
biosimilars.233 Again, since there is so much uncertainty regarding
drug approval for biosimilars and data exclusivity is a more narrow
protection than what patents provide, it is likely that patenting will
continue to be an effective and feasible deterrent in protecting one’s
intellectual property.
VI. A SURVEY OF INDUSTRY PROFESSIONALS ON DATA EXCLUSIVITY
AS COMPARED TO PATENTS REGARDING BIOSIMILARS
Much of the discussion about the interplay between patenting
and data exclusivity in the coming biosimilars market so far is
hypothetical and intuited from limited industry data. It is not yet
known how FDA data exclusivity will affect patenting behavior, if at
all. To get some perspective of what some industry practitioners
think, the author conducted a limited survey of senior managers at
biotechnology companies. Respondents could be chief executive
officers, chief financial officers, chief operating officers, general
counsel, chief scientific officers, regulatory affairs personnel, or other
senior staff. They were asked to complete an anonymous survey
posted online using SurveyMonkey.com that consisted of 10
questions. Managers at companies in Southern California were
approached first, all from small biotech companies. The number of
respondents in this group was limited, however, so the survey request
was posted on biotech and pharma group message boards on
LinkedIn, particularly those interested in biosimilars. Thus the final
group of respondents could have been from across the nation and
possibly international. The survey questions pertained to the U.S.
FDA and the USPTO and patent system, so even an international
respondent would be acceptable if she or he had experience or
familiarity with these systems. As of August 6, 2012, a total of 73
people answered the survey.
demonstrating biosimilarity).
232. Id. (noting that the FDA has provided no clarity on the amount of investment required
for manufacturers of biosimilars).
233. Id. (noting that because lingering uncertainty may discourage use of abbreviated
pathway, no interchangeable biosimilar products will be approved in the near future and that
there is no threat to market share from biosimilar competitors).
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First, to get a perspective of how relevant these issues might be
to these managers or their businesses, the questions asked how many
patents and patent applications their respective companies held, as
well as how many drug products each had either commercialized or in
development. The results for patents and patent applications are in the
following chart:
Figure 3. Number of Issued Patents and Patent Applications

Surprisingly, 18 respondents, representing 24.7% of the survey
population, have no patents issued from the USPTO. A dozen,
representing 16.4%, have one to four patents. Sixteen, or 21.9%, have
5-10 patents and the largest segment, 19, or 26.0%, reported more
than 10 issued patents. With regard to patent applications, only five
respondents, or 6.8% of the population, reported no pending
applications. Ten, or 13.7%, reported 1-4 applications. Six, or 8.2%,
reported 5-10 applications pending and almost a third, 21 respondents
representing 28.8%, reported they have more than 10 patent
applications pending with the USPTO.
Respondents were then asked whether they believe patents
adequately protect their companies from competition. Almost two
thirds (43 respondents), or 59.7%, answered “Yes.” Twenty-nine
respondents, or 40.3%, reported they do not believe patents
adequately protect their companies. One respondent skipped this
question. Just over two thirds (48 respondents), or 66.7%, reported
that their companies use patents as a means of raising money or
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attracting investors. About a third (25 respondents), or 34.7%,
reported they do not. Curiously, this adds up to 101.4%, which
suggests that a respondent may have checked both “Yes” and “No.”
Regardless, it reflects that just more than a supermajority of this
population uses patents for fundraising.
With regard to their product pipelines, senior management was
asked how many drugs their companies have approved for
commercialization and in development. The results are in the
following chart:
Figure 4. Number of New Drugs Approved for Commercialization or in
Development

Forty companies, or 56.3%, are in development stage, that is,
with no approved drugs. Five, or 7%, have one drug on the market.
Another 7% reported having two drugs commercialized and 13, or
18.3%, reported having three or more drugs approved.
Respondents were also asked how many drugs each has in
development. Three respondents, 4.2%, reported no drugs in
development. A half dozen, 8.5%, reported having one drug in
development. Nine companies, or 12.7%, reported having two drug
candidates and 27 respondents, 38%, are pursuing three or more drug
products. Two respondents skipped this question. This suggests
respondents were primarily development stage companies, with
almost two thirds having no drugs on the market, yet over a third are
pursuing three or more candidates.
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Almost two thirds of the respondents (46), or 63.9%, reported no
biosimilars in development. Five respondents, 6.9%, however,
reported one biosimilar in development and a half dozen, 8.3%, have
two biosimilars in development. Fifteen, or 20.8%, indicated three or
more biosimilars in development. This is helpful insight because it
appears to support the industry perception that developing biosimilars
is so expensive that small companies do not have the resources to
bring biosimilars to market.234 Even if so, however, the response here
shows the foray of some small companies in the biosimilars
marketplace.
It seemed important to get an understanding as to where these
companies were positioned with regard to their patenting efforts and
drug development efforts, in order to get insight into whether they
might have an appreciation for data exclusivity. Seeing that the
majority demonstrated a decent amount of patent activity and a decent
portion had some development efforts directed at biosimilars, it is
likely that many are able to consider whether data exclusivity is
meaningful to their respective companies. The results are as follows:
Figure 5. Perceived Benefit of Data Exclusivity

Just about two thirds (47 respondents), or 66.2%, reported that
they believe data exclusivity does or will benefit their companies by
slowing competition. Ten, or 14.1%, however, said they do not
234. Hadad et al., supra note 111 (remarks of Erika Lietzan, Partner at Covington &
Burling LLP in Washington, D.C.).
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believe data exclusivity does or will slow competition. Fifteen
respondents, representing 21.1%, answered that they do not know.
Similar to asking about the role of patents in fund raising, it
seemed reasonable to inquire whether respondents think data
exclusivity has similar value. The results to this question are as
follows:
Figure 6. Using Data Exclusivity to Raise Money or Attract Investors

Interestingly, the overwhelming majority, 38 people or 53.5% of
the survey population, reported that they believe having data
exclusivity does or will allow them to raise money or attract investors.
Seventeen, or 23.9%, said they do not believe data exclusivity allows
or will allow them to raise money or attract investors. Another 17,
23.9%, said they do not know, and two respondents skipped this
question.
In comparing patent protection with data exclusivity, senior
managers were asked whether they believe data exclusivity protects
their companies better from competition than patents. The results are
reflected in the following chart:

ROTH

2/28/2013 10:29 AM

2013]

FDA DATA EXCLUSIVITY

295

Figure 7. Data Exclusivity Protection versus Patent Protection

Twenty-three people, 31.9%, said they believe data exclusivity
protects or will protect their companies from competition better than
patents. Twenty-five, 34.7%, however, stated patents provide better
protection. Seventeen, or 23.6%, believe data exclusivity will protect
their companies about the same as patents. Seven respondents, 9.7%,
said they do not know whether data exclusivity protects better than
patents. One respondent skipped this question.
The next question in the survey asked whether having data
exclusivity on a product would make one less likely to seek patent
protection. The following chart displays the responses:
Figure 8. Reliance on Data Exclusivity versus Patents
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Over a fifth of the population (15 respondents), or 21.1%,
agreed. Almost a third (22), or 31%, said they would be more likely to
patent. Almost two fifths (28), or 39.4%, reported that they believe
they would still engage in about the same amount of patent activity. A
half dozen, representing 8.5%, said they do not know whether their
patenting behavior would change.
This answer is telling because it runs directly counter to the
position of commentators who believe data exclusivity will replace or
reduce patenting. Along this vein, the Intellectual Property Owners
Association (IPOA) took a poll during a webinar held on March 22,
2012, asking attendees what they believed the impact of the twelveyear data exclusivity period would be on the importance of patent
protection for biotech companies.235 Sixty-eight percent of attendees
said patents will continue to be very important; while 32% answered
patents will diminish in importance.236 This IPOA question is very
similar to the survey question on the expected importance of patents.
Combining those from the survey that indicated they would patent the
same or more results in 70.4%. As noted, 21.1% indicated they are
less likely to patent. These results are quite similar to the IPOA poll
during which webinar attendees answered 68% and 32%,
respectively.237 The IPOA webinar attendees were purportedly biotech
professionals (though not necessarily senior management), and thus,
the population is likely similar to the survey respondents for this
article, who were also purportedly biotech professionals.
Lastly, respondents were asked to give their opinion as to what
number of years they believed was necessary for their companies to
either recoup their drug developments costs or otherwise be
incentivized to develop biosimilars. The survey informed them of the
current twelve-year period and the proposed seven-year period being
considered by the Obama Administration. The following chart shows
the opinions of the respondents:

235. See Hadad et al., supra note 111.
236. Id.
237. The author called the IPOA and asked how many attendees had registered or signed
on to the webinar on March 22, 2012. The IPOA representative explained there were 60
registrants for the webinar, and while the exact number of respondents to the poll was not
known, the IPOA representative explained that 90% of registrants typically attend the webinars;
of the attendees, 70% historically answer the polls. Thus, the population of the webinar
attendees who answered the poll on March 22, 2012, was about 38 people.
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Figure 9. Preferred Length of Data Exclusivity Period

Three respondents, 4.2%, reported 1-5 years of data exclusivity
is sufficient. Twenty-eight, or 38.9%, indicated 6-8 years is
appropriate. Almost half (35), or 48.6%, want 9-12 years. Seven
respondents, representing 9.7%, desire 13 or more years, which is
remarkable considering the number of commentators and industry
professionals who suggest a much longer period is required.238 These
results are also revealing because they run counter to those
commentators who insist that 12 years is insufficient. Combining the
first three groups of survey respondents indicates 91.7% can live with
somewhere between one and 12 years of data exclusivity.
This is also an interesting outcome because, when considering
that many commentators and industry professionals strongly oppose
shortening the period, just under half of these respondents, 43.1%
(combining the first two groups), are in the 1-8 year range. Thus this
segment appears likely agreeable to the Obama Administration’s
seven-year proposal and they may still be incentivized to pursue
biosimilars. Over half, 58.3% (combining the second two groups),
prefer more than eight years of data exclusivity and obviously
disagree with the seven-year proposal.
Comparing this last question regarding preferred period of data
exclusivity to the earlier question of how many biosimilars are in
development may provide some insight into the responding
238. Vernon et al., supra note 118, at 71 (insisting no less than 17 years of data exclusivity
is necessary to recoup development costs).
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population. Although, as noted earlier, 63.9% have no biosimilars in
development, over a third, 36%, are developing one or more
biosimilars. The latter would likely favor a reduced period of data
exclusivity so that they can get their biosimilars on the market faster.
Yet one would intuit that innovators would prefer a longer period of
data exclusivity.
To examine whether there is such a preference, the preferred
number of years of data exclusivity was examined against the
responses of these biosimilar developers. Twenty-six respondents
claim to have one or more biosimilars in development. These are
likely imitators, who would prefer a shorter period of data exclusivity
so they can bring a biosimilar to market quicker. Of these biosimilar
developers, only two respondents, or 8% of this subset, stated that 1-5
years of data exclusivity was sufficient. Nine, or 35%, said 6-8 years
is sufficient. Half, or 13 biosimilar developers, said 9-12 years was
sufficient. The remaining two, or 8%, want 13 or more years. The
dominating preference in this group is obvious: the half that wants 912 years. Less than half here believe that eight or fewer years are
sufficient. More than half believes nine or more years are needed.
The 46 respondents, 63.9%, with no biosimilars in development
were also examined in this fashion. These are likely innovators who
would prefer a longer period of data exclusivity, to hold back the
biosimilar developers. Of these, only one, 2.2%, selected 1-5 years of
data exclusivity. Nineteen innovators, or 41.3% of this subset, said 68 years is sufficient. Twenty-two, representing 47.8%, said 9-12 years
is the correct period. The remaining five, or 10.9%, want 13 or more
years. The total here is 104.2% because one respondent selected both
6-8 years and 9-12 years.
One innovator selected 1-5 years, but a couple of imitators did,
suggesting not much difference whether imitators or innovators prefer
a shorter period of data exclusivity. Similarly, 43.5% of innovators
believe that eight or fewer years are sufficient, while 58.7% believes
nine or more years are needed. Very close to this, 43% of imitators
want eight or fewer years and 58% want nine or more years. This
shows innovators and imitators in the survey population have very
similar preferences with regard to the period of data exclusivity.
What about patenting behavior? Some respondents failed to
answer one or both parts of the question regarding patents and patent
applications. Even so, those who entered answers were examined
from the perspective of innovators (those who are not developing any
biosimilars) in comparison with imitators (those who reported
developing one or more biosimilars). Of the innovators who answered
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the patent part of this question (41 respondents), 11, or 27% of
innovators, claim to have 10 or more patents issued. Innovators who
have any (one or more) patents was 26, or 63%. Of the imitators who
answered (22 respondents), 8, or 35%, reported 10 or more issued
patents. Imitators who have any (one or more) patents was 21, or
95%. One might expect patenting behavior to be higher with
innovators, who presumably would want to protect their innovations
from imitators. This survey population, however, demonstrates that
imitators have a proportionately greater number of patents.
A similar comparison was done regarding patent applications. Of
the innovators who answered the patent application part of this
question (25 respondents), almost half (12 respondents), or 48%,
claim to have 10 or more patents pending. Of the imitators who
answered (17 respondents), 9, or 53%, reported 10 or more patents
pending. Innovators who have any (one or more) patents pending
were 20, or 80%. Imitators who have any (one or more) patents
pending were 17, or 100%. Again, this population demonstrates
imitators have a proportionately higher number of patent applications.
Does this mean innovators may come to rely on data exclusivity
rather than patents to protect their innovative drugs? It is possible that
imitators develop their own innovative approaches around the
manufacturing processes. The manufacturing process may be a better
source of patentability rather than the composition of the drug
because a biosimilar drug will not have any data exclusivity and the
drug, itself, may not be patentable if it is so similar to a brand name
drug whose patent term expired. While revealing somewhat lower
patent activity, innovators have clearly not abandoned their patent
efforts for data exclusivity, at least in the survey population. It will be
interesting to see whether patenting behavior changes in the coming
years. As noted earlier, since there is so much uncertainty regarding
drug approval for biosimilars and data exclusivity is a more narrow
protection than what patents provide, it is likely that patenting will
continue to be an effective and possible weapon in the intellectual
property store.
VII.A PROPOSED INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY STRATEGY
Putting this all together, a more effective strategy for an
innovator, rather than relying on data exclusivity alone, is to integrate
patent efforts with data exclusivity. At the outset, though, a much
more effective and comprehensive protection for innovators would be
market exclusivity because it is a complete bar to competition for that
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drug regardless of patents. But because market exclusivity for
biosimilars is only available under very limited circumstances, and,
more importantly, market exclusivity has not entered the discussions
of legislators, industry professionals, or commentators, it is highly
unrealistic to suggest it at this juncture. A more practical approach is
recommended here.
Clearly one has a choice whether to patent, but no choice with
regard to data exclusivity. If one is an innovator, data exclusivity
comes along with drug approval and one cannot choose not to seek
drug approval.
Considering how narrow data exclusivity is—protecting only the
innovator’s data on a particular drug for a specific treatment—it
seems illogical that one would completely forgo many of the features
of patents that are absent with data exclusivity. The ability to use
litigation as a tool, defensive strategies—such as counterclaiming and
lodging prior art—to prevent competitors from getting patents issued,
using patents as bargaining chips in negotiations, and bullying and
blocking strategies are all useful characteristics of the patent system
that can be deployed in various strategies. A more effective strategy is
to deploy patent efforts to target areas not covered by data exclusivity.
With the average clinical trial period being 8.5 years,239 data
exclusivity is not available during early stages when critical patenting
decisions need to be made—that is, within a one-year time frame one
has to decide whether to patent.240 The cost of drug development is
already so high in comparison to patenting. Nonetheless, companies
should consider dedicating some early funds to patent efforts, even
for startups with limited funding.
Moreover, the scope of data exclusivity is predictable, thus a
strategy can be deployed to dovetail these protections for maximum
coverage and efficiency. Knowing a particular drug will be protected
for a specific treatment for 12 years, an innovator might focus its
patent efforts to cover other areas instead of covering the same
subject matter, thereby utilizing resources more efficiently. For
example, if the drug license protects the primary invention, one might
shift patent efforts to blocking strategies—targeting other drugs,
related indications, or alternate delivery methods—rather than the
primary invention.
Patent claim drafting strategies may also have to shift as the
239. Dickson & Gagnon, supra note 61, at 418 fig.1.
240. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2011) (imposing a one year statutory bar under certain
conditions).
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biosimilars market develops. For example, the more deviation from
the reference product the FDA allows, the broader the claim scope an
innovator might need.241 Similarly, one might have to consider
whether a “highly similar” product literally infringes a claim or if an
“insubstantially different” biosimilar infringes under the doctrine of
equivalents.242
One might also coordinate patent terms with the period of data
exclusivity to maximize coverage. Perhaps one might push through
patent prosecution to try to get a patent issued quicker to thwart early
competition, before data exclusivity begins, or delay the patent
prosecution process so as to have patent coverage after the data
exclusivity period lapses.
Furthermore, while regulatory impracticality may impede
biosimilar development at the moment, it is likely to ebb as the
regulatory environment evolves. Thus an innovator may then
strategically devote extra patent efforts to target those pathways that
start opening up for biosimilar competitors in order to block their
progress.
These are just a couple of ways data exclusivity and patenting
efforts can be united to provide more robust protection. The survey
results demonstrate, at least anecdotally, that most innovators are
likely not going to abandon patenting efforts in light of FDA data
exclusivity. In fact, if the data exclusivity period gets reduced—as is
already being contemplated in legislation—biotech companies might
realize they made a mistake by forgoing patent protection and end up
with areas of exposure they might otherwise have had protected.
Again, these protections are likely best deployed together. In so
doing, one might need fewer patents. Survey respondents indicated a
decent amount of patenting activity. Perhaps they could reduce their
patent efforts by a third or even half if coordinated with data
exclusivity.
What about the imitator? Imitators also have patent implications
to consider. When a biosimilar is put through testing in order to
demonstrate biosimilarity to the FDA, if the FDA determines
differences in functional characteristics from the reference product, it
might suggest innovative features in the biosimilar that might be
patent worthy. The more similar a candidate is, the more likely it will
receive accelerated approval, but the less similar it is, the more likely
241. Hadad et al., supra note 111 (remarks of Erika Lietzan, Partner at Covington &
Burling LLP in Washington, D.C.).
242. Id.
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it may have more patentable elements.
Nonetheless, the landscape has still not matured sufficiently to
facilitate the much hoped-for biosimilars market. Science will
eventually evolve to provide better tools for demonstrating
biosimilarity, but perhaps the law does not have to wait that long. One
of the characteristics of regulatory impracticality is that the FDA is
required to keep the innovator’s data proprietary and confidential.
While the FDA knows the data and may extrapolate from it with
regard to the reference product, the imitator never sees this data.
Regulatory impracticality can be reduced by amending section
351 of the BPCI to facilitate the flow information from the innovator
to the imitator, particularly with regard to the manufacturing
processes. This would allow the imitator better insight into the
structure of the reference product, which would facilitate reaching
biosimilarity. While sharing proprietary information in this fashion
may shock or offend some audiences, there already exist provisions in
other areas of the BPCI that allow for, and in fact require, certain
confidential information of the imitator to be provided to the
innovator so that the innovator may assess potential patent
infringement.
Immediately following subsection 351(k) of the BPCI, which
allows for accelerated approval of biologics, is new subsection 351(l)
for “Patents,” which sets forth procedures for limited access to
confidential information of the biosimilar applicant so that the
innovator can evaluate patent infringement.243 The adage, “what’s
good for the goose is good for the gander” seems appropriate here. If
the imitator must disclose limited confidential information for patent
infringement purposes, why should it not be entitled to limited access
to the innovator’s manufacturing data? True, some of the
manufacturing processes may be trade secrets, but if the legislators
already found a way to strike a balance in diplomatically handling
confidential information from imitator to innovator, it does not seem
such a far cry that the legislators could fashion a mechanism to handle
sensitive disclosures from innovator to imitator. After all, the purpose
of the BPCI is to foster a biosimilars market.
The recommendation here is simply to put some teeth into that
policy. Regulatory impracticality may have arisen unintentionally, but
let us intentionally resolve it. The recommendation here is not so
bold. Risking some trade secret exposure serves the greater good, and

243.

BPCI § 351(l) (PPACA § 7002(a)(2)).
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what is proposed here is essentially a quid pro quo: innovator and
imitator each receive some limited access. Subsection 351(l) limits
not only what can be viewed, but who sees it and how it can be used.
Similar limitations can be implemented in the recommendation made
here so that the value of an innovator’s trade secrets is preserved, and
downstream use or abuse by the imitator is curtailed, in the course of
facilitating the policy of fostering biosimilar development.
Forsaking limited rights is not foreign to the intellectual property
world. For example, patent law policy contains provisions that require
compulsory licensing, which essentially force a patent holder to
forsake some patent rights (such as typical rights to exclude and not
license the patent). Compulsory licensing forces a patent holder to
allow another party to practice the patent in order to serve the greater
good of society, which will enjoy the benefit of the invention. The
patent holder gets a royalty in exchange for the compulsory license.
Similarly, if the BPCI were to be amended such that imitators have
limited access to data needed to aid biosimilar development, surely
legislators can create an exchange that balances the interests of
innovators, biosimilar developers and society.244
Perhaps in exchange for sharing sensitive and valuable
proprietary information, innovators can have a longer period of data
exclusivity, or broader protection, more akin to market exclusivity, or
even a financial return analogous to a compulsory license. A royalty
in this fashion would make sense in that the imitator would be
enjoying a commercial benefit by having access to the innovator’s
data for the purpose of accelerated approval. After all, if the
innovator’s data is helping the imitator get to market quicker, the
innovator ought to enjoy some of the commercial success, and thus a
royalty might be an appropriate solution.
VIII.CONCLUSION
This article explored the current and evolving landscapes of
FDA data exclusivity and the U.S. patent system. Comparing FDA
data exclusivity with patent protection is like comparing apples with
oranges. Both are indisputably forms of intellectual property that
protect against competition in the pharma and biotech industries, but
the characteristics of these protections are very different. In
comparing these two protections and considering discussions from
244. There are strong arguments the other way—that there should be no disclosure of data.
Access to data is obviously a highly contentious issue. Further discussion in this area is beyond
the scope of this article.
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commentators as well as survey feedback from biotech industry
practitioners, it appears that data exclusivity and patenting are best
used in concert.
Since there is so much uncertainty regarding drug approval for
biosimilars, and data exclusivity is a more narrow protection than
what patents provide; thus it is likely that patenting will continue to
be an effective and viable weapon in the intellectual property arsenal.
The accelerated approval process is still being fleshed out between the
FDA and legislators. It is too early to tell whether data exclusivity
will have the impact on patent behavior that some predict. Legislators
would do well to amend the BPCI to reduce and possibly eliminate
regulatory impracticality and craft concrete mechanisms to facilitate
the biosimilars market they have been trying to foster since the 1980s.
In the meantime, companies should continue their patenting efforts,
targeting areas that data exclusivity does not cover and keeping an
eye out for changes in patenting efforts that may be warranted as the
FDA reviews biosimilars. When the biosimilars market develops
further in the United States, these inquiries can be reconsidered and
any emerging paradigm shifts shall be examined. Undoubtedly, more
discussion is forthcoming.

